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SHOULD STATES BAN THE USE OF NON-POSITIVE INTERVENTIONS IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION? RE-EXAMINING POSITIVE BEHAVIOR 






It is a bedrock principle of special education law that each disabled child is entitled to an 
“individualized education program”1 that will meet that child’s “unique needs.”2 In Bryant v. 
New York State Education Department,
3
 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit issued a decision that could have far-reaching implications for this bedrock principle. In 
Bryant, the Second Circuit held that the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA)
4
 permit a state educational agency to ban the use of non-positive behavior 
interventions.
5
 Scientific research demonstrates that such interventions can effectively treat 
severe self-injurious and aggressive behavior in disabled children.
6
 By endorsing a statewide ban 
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1
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(a) (2012). 
2
 Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
3
 692 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2012). 
4
 20 U.S.C. §1400. 
5
 Bryant, 692 F.3d at 215. 
6
 See id. at 221 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing studies that “describe 
 
  2 
on certain behavior interventions, the Second Circuit’s ruling severely impacts a child’s right to 
an individualized educational program tailored to meet that child’s unique needs.  
The plaintiffs in Bryant challenged the authority of the New York State Educational 
Department (NYSED) to issue regulations that prohibit the use of “aversive interventions”7 for 
children who are eligible for special education under IDEA.
8
  The Second Circuit held that IDEA 
permits NYSED to adopt a statewide “policy that relies on positive behavioral interventions 
only.”9  
The decision in Bryant is deeply flawed for several reasons. First, the Second Circuit 
erred when it held that a state educational agency, like NYSED, may issue regulations banning 
the use of non-positive interventions within the state. In fact, IDEA explicitly directs educators to 
“consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports[] and other strategies” to 
address behavior that may impede the child’s learning.10 By ruling that IDEA permits a state to 
preclude the use of any non-positive interventions, the Second Circuit impermissibly wrote the 
words “and other strategies”11 out of the statute. 
Second, the Second Circuit erred when it held that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                                                             
the need for aversive interventions in certain instances” (emphasis in original)). 
7
 Id. at 210 (majority opinion); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 8, §§ 19.5(b)(1), 200.22(e) 
(2014).  
8
 692 F.3d at 210; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 8, § 19.5(b)(1) 
9
 Bryant, 692 F.3d at 213. 
10
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added) (listing special factors that a child’s IEP 
team must consider).  
11
 Id. 
  3 
Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley
12
 requires deference 
to NYSED’s educational choices made through the agency rule-making process.13 In Rowley, the 
Court held that courts should defer to educators’ choice of methodology only when that choice 
has been made as to a particular child and has been the subject of a due process hearing initiated 
by the child’s parents.14 Rowley does not require the judiciary to defer to methodology choices 
that are made at the state agency level via the agency rule-making process.  
Finally, the Second Circuit misunderstood the science of applied behavior analysis. The 
court stated that a ban on non-positive interventions “prohibit[ed] only consideration of a single 
method of treatment without foreclosing other options.”15 Non-positive interventions, however, 
are not a “single method” among many equally available methods. Rather, behavior interventions 
exist along a hierarchy pursuant to which positive-only interventions are considered less 
intrusive than non-positive interventions and are to be implemented earlier in the hierarchy.
16
 If 
positive-only interventions are ineffective to treat severe behavior and non-positive interventions 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
13
 Bryant, 692 F.3d at 216. 
14
 458 U.S. at 208. 
15
 Bryant, 692 F.3d at 214. 
16
 See, e.g., Dorothea C. Lerman & Christina M. Vorndran, On the Status of Knowledge for Using 
Punishment: Implications for Treating Behavior Disorders, 4 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 431, 431–
464 (2002) (addressing the research on punishment and its effect in clinical settings); Sarah-Jeanne Salvy 
et al., Contingent Electric Shock (SIBIS) and a Conditioned Punisher Eliminate Severe Head Banging in 
a Preschool Child, 19 BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 59, 59–72 (2004) (discussing several non-positive 
behavioral interventions including contingent electric shock).  
  4 
are banned by the state law, then the behavior may become untreatable. Moreover, research 
demonstrates that, for some children, an effective intervention plan will require a combination of 
both positive and non-positive interventions.
17
 A ban on non-positive interventions could prevent 
such children from receiving the appropriate multi-component behavior plan.
18
  
IDEA’s requirements for the use of behavioral interventions likely will be addressed 
when Congress next amends and reauthorizes IDEA. Many disability rights organizations have 
advocated for legislative action that would ban the use of “aversive interventions.”19 In recent 
years, members of Congress have introduced several bills designed to create federal educational 
                                                                                                                                                             
17
 Salvy, supra note 16, at 60, 70. 
18
 See infra Part II(E) (discussing the positive aspects of a multi-component behavior plan). 
19
 See, e.g., Restraint and Seclusion (APRAIS), TASH, http://tash.org/advocacy-issues/coalitions-
partnerships/aprais/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). Non-positive or aversive interventions are not 
synonymous with seclusion or restraint, although some disability rights organizations do define “aversive 
interventions” to include seclusion and restraint (as well as other forms of abusive interventions). Council 
of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA), Unsafe in the Schoolhouse: Abuse of Children With 
Disabilities, COPAA (May 27, 2009), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/collection/662B1866-952D-41FA-B7F3-
D3CF68639918/UnsafeCOPAAMay_27_2009.pdf. However, seclusion or restraint should be used only 
in emergency situations that involve an imminent risk of serious physical injury to the child or others. See 
United States Dep’t of Educ., Restraint and Seclusion: Resource Document, (May 2012), ED.GOV 3 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/restraints-and-seclusion-resources.pdf (stating that restraint and 
seclusion are not “routine” measures). Behavioral interventions, in contrast, are designed by professionals 
to address problem behavior exhibited by a specific child. The use of a particular behavioral intervention 
on a systematic basis differs from the emergency use of seclusion and restraint. 
  5 
policy on the appropriate use of aversive behavioral interventions in a school setting.
20
 However, 
none of that proposed legislation has been enacted. Thus, the next IDEA reauthorization process 
will be the opportunity for Congress to craft educational policy on this important topic. 
This Article contends that a complete ban on the use of non-positive behavioral 
interventions violates a core tenet of the IDEA: specifically that each child with a disability is 
entitled to an individualized education program designed to meet that child’s unique needs. Part I 
of this Article provides a summary of applied behavior analysis and an overview of the “positive 
behavior supports” (PBS) movement. Part II sets forth the history of IDEA and the statutory 
provisions that address the use of behavior interventions. Part III discusses various states’ 
regulations regarding the use of non-positive, or aversive, interventions, including the New York 
regulations. Part IV examines the litigation that was filed after the New York regulations were 
issued. Part V details the weaknesses of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Bryant and its potential 
consequences on the educational programming of children with severe behavior. Part VI 
recommends various ways in which Congress could amend IDEA to clarify the statutory 
references to behavioral interventions techniques. 
 
II. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS AND 
SUPPORTS 
 
A.  Basic Principles of Applied Behavior Analysis 
 Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) is a science “devoted to the understanding and 
improvement of human behavior.”21 The title, ABA, is significant. The word “applied” indicates 
                                                                                                                                                             
20
 See infra Part II(D) (discussing the bills and senate reports). 
21
 JOHN. O. COOPER ET AL., APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 3 (2d ed. 2007). The Cooper text, known 
as the “White Book,” is an iconic textbook in the field of Applied Behavior Analysis. Id. at xv (Preface).  
  6 
that ABA is designed to bring about changes in socially significant behavior that will improve a 
person’s daily life in terms of social interaction, self-care, vocation, and recreational activities.22 
The word “behavior” requires that the behavior analyst23 precisely define a particular behavior 
and accurately measure changes in that behavior.
24
 Finally, the word “analysis” requires the 
behavior analyst to determine that there is a causal relationship between any intervention chosen 
and changes in behavior.
25
 One of the hallmarks of good “analysis” is the ability to reliably (or 
repeatedly) demonstrate a change in behavior when an intervention is introduced.
26
 
 A core concept of ABA is the “three-term contingency[,]” or the “ABCs,” of behavior 
analysis.
27
 The ABCs can be described as follows: the occurrence of a particular behavior (B) 
will depend on both the antecedent conditions (A) that exist before the behavior occurs and the 
consequences (C) resulting from the behavior.
28
 When examining behavior, an initial 
requirement is to determine both the antecedent to the behavior and the consequences that 
                                                                                                                                                             
22
 Id. at 16.  
23
 The term “behavior analyst” as used in this Article refers broadly to professionals who use ABA 
principles in their field and specifically includes school psychologists. Because behavior analysis 
principles are increasingly applied in school, “[e]ffective school psychologists are apt to be good behavior 
analysts.” Ruth A. Ervin & Kristal E. Ehrhardt, Behavior Analysis and School Psychology, in HANDBOOK 
OF APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 113, 128 (John Austin & James E. Carr eds., 2000). 
24
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 16. 
25
 Id. at 17.  
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. at 41–42. 
28
 Id. at 42. 
  7 
naturally (i.e., in the absence of any planned intervention) occur whenever the behavior is 
displayed.
29
 Once the ABCs of the behavior are known, interventions can be devised to reduce 
problem behavior and increase appropriate behavior.
30
 
Another essential premise of ABA is that all behavior, either appropriate or problematic, 
serves a function for the individual who exhibits the behavior. A child who is disruptive in class, 
for example, may engage in the behavior because it gets the teacher’s attention. The function of 
such behavior is attention-seeking, which could include a desire either for positive attention 
(praise) or negative attention (scolding or reprimand).
31
 Another common function of such 
behavior is escape from task.
32
 A child who feels overwhelmed by a particular demand may 
engage in problem behavior as a means to interrupt the demand being placed on the child.
33
 
Problem behavior also may serve the function of gaining the child access to desired tangible 
items or activities.
34
 Finally, for some children with disabilities, problem behavior can serve a 
function known as automatic reinforcement, where the behavior provides internal feedback that 






 Ruth A. Ervin et al., A Descriptive Analysis and Critique of Empirical Literature on School-based 
Functional Assessment, 30 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 193, 203–04 (2001); Lynn Koegel et al., Interventions for 
Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders in Inclusive School Settings, 19 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 
401, 402 (2012). 
32
 DANIEL CRIMMINS ET AL., POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR STUDENTS WITH BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 
74–75 (2007); Ervin, supra note 31, at 203–04. 
33
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8–9. 
34
 Id. at 74–75. 
  8 
the child desires.
35
 That feedback can be sensory, as in the case of a child who engages in head-
banging, rocking, hand-flapping, inappropriate vocalizations, hair-pulling, or self-biting.
36
 
When first examining a particular behavior exhibited by a child, the behavior analyst will 
undertake a process known as a Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA). An FBA is the 
process of identifying and defining a particular behavior, its function, the antecedent events that 
reliably predict the occurrence of the behavior, and the consequences or events that in the 
absence of interventions may further the function of the behavior.
37
 A properly conducted FBA 
could reveal, for example, that the antecedent to a particular behavior is a task that overwhelms 
the child and that one consequence of the behavior, such as being removed from class, serves the 
function of allowing the child to escape from the task. Because the consequence furthers the 




Armed with the results of a comprehensive FBA, the behavior analyst can begin to devise 
a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) that alters antecedents to the behavior to keep the behavior 
from occurring or introduces consequences for the behavior when it occurs, or uses a 
combination of both antecedents and consequences.
39
   
                                                                                                                                                             
35
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 501–02. 
36
 Eileen M. Roscoe et al., A Comparison of Noncontingent Reinforcement and Sensory Extinction as 
Treatments for Self-Injurious Behavior, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 635 (1998). 
37
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 500; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 90; H. Rutherford Turnbull III, et al., 
IDEA, Positive Behavioral Supports, and School Safety, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 456 (2001). 
38
 Lerman & Vorndran, supra note 16, at 433. 
39
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 486–97 (discussing antecedent interventions).  
  9 
 Antecedent-based interventions are designed to alter preexisting environmental 
conditions or variables that exist or occur before a behavior is demonstrated.
40
 Some antecedents 
to problem behavior may be “setting events,” such as lack of sleep, illness, or noise in the 
environment.
41
 Other antecedents may be the introduction of a request or task upon the 
individual, triggering the behavior.
42
 If the function of a problem behavior is to escape from a 
task demand, the behavior analyst can change the antecedent conditions by “shortening the task, 
simplifying the demands, [or] clarifying the instructions.”43 These targeted changes to antecedent 
conditions are interventions that are designed to keep problem behavior from occurring.
44
 
Consequence-based interventions are implemented when behavior occurs, with the 
intention to affect the frequency with which the behavior will reoccur in the future.
45
 
Consequences can act either to increase (in the case of an appropriate behavior) or decrease (in 
the case of a problem behavior) the frequency with which behavior will occur in the future.
46
  
There are two available consequences: reinforcement and punishment.
47
 A “reinforcer” is 
                                                                                                                                                             
40
 Id. at 28. 
41
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8, 109 (identifying four dimensions for setting events); George Sugai 
et al., Applying Positive Behavior Support and Functional Behavioral Assessment in Schools, 2 J. 
POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 131, 138 (2000). 
42
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8; Sugai, supra note 41, at 138. 
43




 COOPER, supra note 21, at 33–37; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19.  
46
 Turnbull, supra note 37, at 453–454. 
47
 Cooper, supra note 21, at 34–37. 
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any consequence that is designed to increase the likelihood of behavior occurring in the future.
48
 
A “punisher” is any consequence that is designed to decrease the likelihood that the behavior 
will occur in the future.
49
  
Each type of consequence can be further divided. Positive reinforcement occurs when the 
behavior is followed by a consequence that will increase the likelihood of the behavior occurring 
in the future.
50
 Positive reinforcement commonly occurs when parents verbally praise a child for 
good behavior; the verbal praise will increase the likelihood that the behavior will occur more 
frequently in the future. Other common forms of positive reinforcement include allowing access 




Negative reinforcement occurs when good behavior leads to the elimination of an 
unwanted condition.
52
 A simple example of negative reinforcement is the ability of a child who 
has done satisfactory school work to “take a break” from work. The unwanted condition—having 
to do school work—is removed by virtue of the child’s satisfactory completion of a task.  
                                                                                                                                                             
48
 Id. at 34. 
49
 Id.; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 21. 
50
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 36; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19. 
51
 There are also “schedules of reinforcement,” which determine the frequency with which 
reinforcement is delivered to the child. Continuous reinforcement is delivered every time the child 
engages in the desired behavior, and is used most often when a child is learning a new behavior. 
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 25. Partial or intermittent reinforcement reinforces behavior occasionally, 
and is used most often to maintain appropriate behavior that the child displays regularly. Id. 
52
 Id. at 19. 
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Punishment also can be divided into positive and negative punishment. Negative 
punishment occurs when the child loses access to either desired conditions or the opportunity to 
acquire desired materials for a period of time.
53
 For example, negative punishment occurs when a 
child who does not behave appropriately loses a privilege, such as watching TV. Positive 
punishment occurs when a condition is introduced to the child as a consequence of the 
behavior.
54
 An example of positive punishment might be the requirement that a child who has 
thrown objects on the floor must clean up the mess.  
 Intrinsically the terms “reinforcement” and “punishment” do not have any moral or social 
value attached to them.
55
 An adult may inadvertently reinforce a behavior even when the adult is 
not interacting “positively” with a child, such as the circumstances in which a child who seeks 
adult attention engages in disruptive behavior, causing the adult to scream at the child. 
Conversely, an adult who applies a punisher is not acting with any malice or ill will.
56
 
                                                                                                                                                             
53




 Ron Van Houten et al., The Right to Effective Behavioral Treatment, 21 J. APPLIED BEHAV. 
ANALYSIS 381, 384 (1988) (“Techniques are not considered as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ according to 
whether they involve the use of antecedent rather than consequent stimuli or reinforcement rather than 
punishment.”). 
56
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 328 (“It is important to point out that punishment is defined neither by 
the actions of the person delivering the consequences…nor by the nature of those consequences.”); 
Nirbhay N. Singh et al., Nonaversive and Aversive Interventions: Issues, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF 
NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3, 4 
(Alan C. Repp & Nirbhay N. Singh eds., 1990) (explaining that “punishment” is a term with a technical 
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 To address a specific behavior, the behavior analyst will take the results of an FBA and 
design a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) that will increase appropriate behavior and reduce 
inappropriate behavior as desired.
57
 In determining which interventions to select, professional 
standards have established a hierarchy of interventions under which the behavior analyst should 
select the “least restrictive” intervention that may bring about a change in the behavior.58 This 
hierarchy attempts to ensure that interventions are no more intrusive to the person’s life or 
independence than are necessary to produce the desired effect.
59
 And yet the behavior analyst 
also must consider whether the least restrictive intervention will be effective to change behavior. 
Choosing an intervention simply because it is less intrusive is “unacceptable … [if] available 
research indicate[s] that other procedures would be more effective.”60 
While intrusiveness—the extent to which an intervention affects a person’s life or 
independence—is a concept as to which professional judgment might vary in any particular case, 
                                                                                                                                                             
meaning). 
57
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 89. 
58
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 350-51; see e.g., Gina Green, Least Restrictive Use of Reductive 
Procedures: Guidelines and Competencies, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND 
AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56 at 479, 
479-493 (discussing the restrictive procedures of the rules that “govern the use of behavior change”). 
59
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 350; see also Christina M. Vorndran & Dorothea C. Lerman, 
Establishing and Maintaining Treatment Effects with Less Intrusive Consequences via a Pairing 
Procedure, 39 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 35, 35 (2006) (stating as a “general consensus . . . that 
interventions should be designed to be as least intrusive or restrictive as possible.”). 
60
 Van Houten, supra note 55, at 383. 
  13 
a consensus has emerged that consequences based on reinforcement are considered less intrusive 
than consequences based on punishment such that, “whenever possible,”61 the behavior analyst is 
to select reinforcement consequences before punishment consequences.
62
 Thus, the proper 
application of the least restrictive or intrusive hierarchy would dictate that a BIP would start with 
a “comprehensive positive program.”63 If those positive measures do not change the problem 
behavior, then the BIP might be modified to include punishment-based interventions.
64
  
B.  Early Applications of ABA Principles to Treat Severe Behavior 
The most well-known researcher in the field of ABA is B.F. Skinner. Skinner, however, 
primarily applied ABA principles to animals.
65
 The first known application of ABA principles on 
                                                                                                                                                             
61
 See BACB Guidelines for Responsible Conduct for Behavior Analysts: Guideline 4.05 BEHAV. 
ANALYST CERTIFICATION BD., http://bacb.com/index.php?page=57 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) 
[hereinafter BACB guidelines] (“The behavior analyst recommends reinforcement rather than punishment 
whenever possible.”).  
62
 Id. at 4.05; COOPER, supra note 21 at 350-51; see also Stacey L. Carter & John J. Wheeler, 
Considering the Intrusiveness of Interventions, 20 INT’L. J. OF SPECIAL EDUC. 136, 136–37 (2005) 
(ranking interventions from Level I to Level IV).  
63
 Maurice A. Feldman, Balancing Freedom from Harm and Right to Treatment for Persons with 
Developmental Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE 
INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 261, 266. 
64
 Michael R. Mayton et al. Intrusiveness of Behavioral Treatments for Adults with Intellectual 
Disability, 35 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 54, 55 (2014) (noting that a hierarchy of intrusiveness 
that progresses from least to most intrusive, as follows: reinforcement-based interventions, extinction 
procedures, response cost procedures, and the use of aversive stimuli). 
65
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 18. 
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a human subject took place in 1949.
66
 Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, other professionals 
began to apply Skinner’s principles to human behavior, resulting in many “pioneering 
applications of behavior principles to education.”67 The year 1968 marked the “formal beginning 
of contemporary applied behavior analysis,”68 when, among other events, the Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis began publication.
69
  
Some of the early applications of ABA involved disabled children who engaged in 
severe, potentially life-threatening behaviors.
70
 Such behaviors can threaten the health and safety 
of both the child and others, and cause the children to be isolated from their families and 
communities, even leading to life-long institutionalization.
71
 
A 1969 study by Ivar Lovaas and James Simmons describes the types of self-destructive 
behaviors that some children exhibit: 
This behavior consists primarily of “head-banging” (against walls and furniture), 
“arm-banging” (against sharp corners), beating themselves on their heads or in 
their faces with their fists or knees, and biting themselves on wrists, arms, and 
shoulders. In some children, the self-destructive behavior can be severe enough to 
                                                                                                                                                             
66
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 10–16 (describing historical underpinnings of ABA and its application 
to human behavior). 
67
 COOPER, supra, note 21, at 14; see also CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19 (noting that Skinner’s 
work “has been replicated and extended by many other researchers and clinicians”). 
68




 O. Ivar Lovaas & James Q. Simmons, Manipulation of Self-Destruction in Three Retarded 
Children, 3 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 143, 143 (1969). 
71
 Id.; Van Houten, supra note 55, at 382 (dangerous behaviors can “serve as barriers to . . .  
independence or social acceptability”). 
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pose a major problem for the child’s safety. Thus, one can frequently see that such 
children have removed large quantities of flesh from their bodies, torn out their 




Several other scientific articles detail such severe behavior.
73
 These articles also detail how these 
behaviors isolate these children from their families and communities.
74
 Indeed, the longer that a 
child exhibits self-injurious and aggressive behaviors, the more intractable the behavior 
becomes.
75
 Thus, it is imperative that the child who engages in self-injurious, aggressive, or 
other destructive behaviors quickly receive the most effective and appropriate intervention that 
will bring about meaningful change in the child’s behavior.76 
                                                                                                                                                             
72
 Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72 (typeface altered). 
73
 See, e.g., Louis P. Hagopian et al., Effectiveness of Functional Communication Training with and 
Without Extinction and Punishment: A Summary of 21 Inpatient Cases, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 
211, 213 (1998) (detailing the self-destructive behavior exhibited in each client involved in a study 
including hitting, slapping, throwing objects, and running toward an open door); Rachel H. Thompson et 
al., Effects of Reinforcement for Alternative Behavior During Punishment of Self-Injury, 32 J. APPLIED 
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 317, 319 (1999) (detailing the “SIB” or self-injurious behavior exhibited in each 
participant in the study including hitting and other forceful contact); Ron Van Houten & Ahmos Rolider, 
Recreating the Scene: An Effective Way to Provide Delayed Punishment for Inappropriate Motor 
Behavior, 21 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 187, 188 (1988) (examining the aggressive behavior of two 
participants in the study including biting other children and stealing small items). 
74
 Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72, at 143. 
75
 Koegel, supra note 31, at 402 (Without appropriate interventions, challenging behaviors can 
“persist across an individual’s lifespan.”). 
76
 Glen Dunlap et. al., Preventing Serious Behavior Problems Through Skill Development and Early 
Intervention, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR 
 
  16 
In early applications of ABA to treat such severe problem behavior, the concept of an 
FBA had not yet been developed. Therefore, behavioral interventions often were applied in a 
reactive manner to address behavior as it occurred without any preliminary determination about 
the antecedent conditions to, or the function of, the behavior.
77
 Many of these early interventions 
applied several forms of punishment consequences that were physical or painful in nature. 
Among the forms of punishment that were detailed in the literature were use of noxious liquids, 
sprays of water mist in the face, slapping, hitting, physical restraint, or contingent electric 
shock.
78
 The word “aversive” began to appear in the scientific literature as an adjective to 
describe the application of these techniques to address problem behavior.
79
 These unpleasant or 
                                                                                                                                                             
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 273, 276 (noting that problem behavior, 
if untreated, becomes more intense and complex). 
77
 Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention 
Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.175, 175 (2011). 
78
 See, e.g. Michael F. Dorsey et al., Treatment of Self-Injurious Behavior Using a Water Mist: Initial 
Response Suppression and Generalization, 13 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 343, 343–53 (1980) 
(examining a study which “evaluated the effects of a fine mist of water applied to the face contingent 
upon self-injurious behavior”); Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72, at 143 (discussing the use of 
“straitjackets” or tying a child’s feet to his or her bed as forms of restraint); Barry A. Tanner & Marlene 
Zeiler, Punishment of Self-Injurious Behavior Using Aromatic Ammonia as the Aversive Stimulus, 8 J. 
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 53, 53–57 (1975) (detailing the use of aromatic ammonia as aversive 
stimuli); see also Stacey B. Seiden & Perry A. Zirkel, Aversive Therapy for Handicapped Students, 48 
EDUC. L. REP. 1029, 1032–35 (1989) (reviewing the psychological literature and relevant cases). 
79
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3 (“Aversives came into use when professionals encountered 
difficulty managing seemingly intractable patterns of dangerous or destructive behavior” such as self-
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painful aversive therapies were “sometimes used inappropriately or abusively.”80  
Beginning in the 1970s, the nation experienced a heightened awareness of deplorable 
conditions in some institutional settings where adults and children with disabilities resided. In 
1972, a television documentary on the conditions at Willowbrook State School on Staten Island, 
New York, gave the public shocking video footage of naked children sitting on the floor in 
overcrowded, filthy rooms or being fed by staff workers who shoveled food into the children’s 
mouths using the staff workers’ hands.81 In reaction, several lawsuits were filed seeking to 
reform conditions at these institutions or, alternatively, to release the institution’s residents.82 
One such case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
83
 detailed some of the abusive 
practices used at institutions to manage residents’ behavior, including widespread use of physical 
restraints for long periods of time, the use of seclusion rooms to control residents, and physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
injury or aggression.). 
80
 Crighton Newsom & Kimberly A. Kroeger, Nonaversive Treatment, in CONTROVERSIAL 
THERAPIES FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: FAD FASHION AND SCIENCE IN PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE 405, 406 (John W. Jacobson et. al., eds. 2005).  
81
 Video footage of conditions at the Willowbrook State School can be found at Willowbrook State 
School Exposed. Unbelievable (YouTube Video Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbiYJkiX-Dg; see also David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, THE 
WILLOWBROOK WARS 86–87 (1984) (detailing the squalid conditions of the Willowbrook school 
including “the stench of urine and sweat” and “chronic shortages of clothing, sheets, and bedding”).  
82
 N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
83
 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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abuse at the hands of staff or other residents.
84
  
In response to such revelations, both federal and state governments enacted statutes or 
regulations designed to promote the rights of disabled individuals to be treated with dignity.
85
 
C.  Rise of the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Support Movement 
As news reports and court cases raised public awareness about the treatment of disabled 
individuals in institutional settings, behavior analysts began to debate the ethics of using 
interventions that involved pain, discomfort, or undignified treatment.
86
 Some advocates argued 
that professional ethics dictated that disabled individuals should be free from discomfort or pain, 
while others argued that individuals had a right to effective treatment to treat severe behavior, 
even if the treatment itself involved some pain or discomfort.
87
 In the 1980s, this debate among 
policy makers, advocacy groups, and behavior analysts about the use of aversive interventions 
became “fierce.”88 Some professionals and policy makers, including officials at the United States 
Department of Education, theorized that positive-only, nonaversive interventions could provide a 
behavior support structure of both effective and dignified treatment, but there was no scientific 
                                                                                                                                                             
84
 Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1306–11.  
85
 Dennis P. Saccuzzo, Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification for Developmentally Disabled and 
Other Handicapped Persons, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (1999) (discussing events leading to states’ 
enactment of protections for developmentally disabled individuals receiving mental health or other health 
care treatment generally). 
86
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 2–3; Seiden & Zirkel, supra note 78, at 1030. 
87
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3. 
88
 Madeleine Will, Foreword, in EDWARD G. CARR ET AL., POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT FOR 
PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS xv (1999). 
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research to support the use of a positive-only intervention scheme.
89
  
Over the course of several years, the federal government, through the United States 
Department of Education, spent several million dollars to fund research into the use of positive 
or non-aversive approaches to managing behavior.
90
 This federally funded research yielded 
scientific support for a positive-only behavioral intervention structure.
91
 Thus, the “positive 




One of the founding tenets of the early PBS movement was to add a “values” component 
to the scientific principles of ABA.
93
 By adding community and social values to the science of 
ABA, PBS proponents deemed certain interventions, even if effective to address problem 
behavior, unacceptable on the grounds that they were “dehumanizing or degrading.”94  
PBS proponents also contended that the widespread use of aversive interventions 
                                                                                                                                                             
89
 Id. at xv. 
90
 See infra Part II(C) (explaining that the National Institute on Disability and Rehabiltation Research 
(NIDRR) awarded a multimillion-dollar grant to university researchers to study Nonaversive Behavior 
Management). 
91
 A 1999 monograph was described as providing the “scientific grounds” that policy makers had 
“wanted a decade ago” to justify the use of a positive-only intervention scheme. Foreword of Madeleine 
Will, supra note 88, at xv. 
92
 Edward G. Carr et al., Positive Behavioral Support: Evolution of an Applied Science, 4 J. POSITIVE 
BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 4 (2002) [hereinafter “Carr 2002”]; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3.  
93
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 4, 41; Sugai, supra note 41, at 134. 
94
 Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 6; Sugai, supra note 41, at 134-36. 
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stemmed from the belief that problem behavior was due to an individual’s unchangeable 
characteristics, such as disability type, without considering extrinsic environmental factors that 
might contribute to problem behavior.
95
 Noting that “people in community settings are 
interdependent,”96 PBS proponents challenged non-disabled individuals to alter their perception 
of the behavior of a disabled individual: 
[T]he focus of intervention must be on changing problem context, not problem 
behavior. We must move beyond blaming the victim (e.g., certain people have 
problems that must be “treated”) to holding societal contexts accountable (e.g., 




This focus on problem context translated into enthusiastic adoption of the FBA process 
and great emphasis on devising interventions that would modify antecedent conditions to keep 
problem behavior from occurring.
98
 PBS proponents contended that the proactive nature of a 
PBS approach could “remediate the environment[] . . . so as to prevent future occurrences of the 
problem behavior.”99 Changing antecedent conditions might include changing the student’s 
physical environment or daily schedule or taking steps to minimize noise or “other 
                                                                                                                                                             
95
 Sugai, supra note 41, at 137. 
96




 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3 (“One distinctive feature of the PBS movement enabled it to 
supplant earlier ABA technologies that were based primarily on punishment: the emphasis on the 
prominent role of function in maintaining problem behavior.”); Sugai, supra note 41, at 135–37. 
99
 EDWARD G. CARR ET AL., POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES 5 (1999) [hereinafter Carr 1999]. 
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environmental irritants.”100 Other antecedent interventions that could reduce the frequency of 
problem behavior at school might involve changes to the curriculum, interspersing easy tasks 
with difficult ones, and changing the complexity or number of instructions from the teacher.
101
 
By pairing changes in antecedent conditions with positive reinforcement of appropriate 
behavior, PBS proponents theorized that the frequency of appropriate behavior would increase, 
leading to a natural decrease in problem behavior.
102
 A pure, PBS-based intervention plan thus 
would not contain any affirmative intervention to address problem behavior on the theory that 
problem behavior naturally would fade away once the individual understood the efficacy of 
gaining positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior.
103
  
Indeed, some PBS proponents soundly condemned the use of “aversive procedures that 
address problem behaviors with reactive, crisis-driven strategies.”104 These professionals 
challenged the belief that punishment was a necessary form of behavioral intervention, labeling 
                                                                                                                                                             
100
 Turnbull, supra note 37, at 452.  
101
 Carr 1999, supra note99, at 12–14; Turnbull, supra note 37, at 452–53. 
102
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14–15. The primary focus was on changing the environment to 
“increase opportunities for the display of positive behavior,” while decreasing the frequency of problem 
behavior was termed an “important, but secondary, goal of PBS.” Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 4–5. 
103
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 8 (“[I]mprovements in environmental conditions and repertoires of 
positive behavior can produce, as a side effect, decreases in problem behavior.”). 
104
 Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 9; Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 5 (“[U]sing aversive procedures 
conforms best to a crisis management paradigm; using PBS conforms best to a prevention paradigm.”); 
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 5 (“Because it awaits the occurrence of problem behavior, reactive discipline 
relies predominantly on punishment and often fails to consider the concerns of learners”). 
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that position as a “myth” founded on a natural human tendency to punish offending behavior.105 
These PBS proponents contended that their “proactive” approach to problem behavior would 
“rende[r] the traditional use of punishment obsolete and unnecessary.”106 
However, early PBS proponents had some disagreements about whether certain 
interventions were indeed “positive.”107 A good illustration of this difficulty involved two forms 
of reinforcement known as “DRO” and “DRA.”108 A “DRO” (“Differential Reinforcement of 
Other behavior”) delivers positive reinforcement to a child who does not engage in problem 
behavior for a specified period of time, even if the child is not otherwise engaged in a specified 
appropriate behavior.
109
 A “DRA” (“Differential Reinforcement of Alternative behavior”) 
delivers reinforcement when the child engages in a specified alternative behavior that is designed 
to replace the problem behavior.
110
 Even though a child could be reinforced through both 
                                                                                                                                                             
105
 Anne M. Donnellan & Gary W. Lavigna, Myths About Punishments, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE 
OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
supra note 56, at 35. 
106
 Id. at 33.  
107
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14–15. Indeed, it has been suggested that the word “positive” is just 
“sugar coating” to make PBS sound more appealing. See James A. Mulick & Eric M. Butter, Positive 
Behavior Support: A Paternalistic Utopian Delusion, in CONTROVERSIAL THERAPIES FOR 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: FAD, FASHION AND SCIENCE IN PROFESSIONAL, supra note 80, at 385, 
390–91 (“Sugar coatings make you feel nice.”). 
108
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14–15 (describing DRO and DRA). 
109
 Id. at 14. 
110
 Id. at 15. 
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intervention forms, some PBS proponents argued that a DRO was not positive because “frequent 
display of problem behavior results in repeated omission of positive reinforcers, an aversive 
event.”111 In the view of those behavior analysts, a DRO operated as a form of punishment.112 




The “DRA/DRO controversy”114 is only illustrative of the debate about whether 
particular interventions are acceptable.
115
 It is a good example, however, of the difficulty of 
                                                                                                                                                             
111
 Id. at 14. For an in-depth analysis of whether DRO is best classified as reinforcement or 
punishment, see Ahmos Rolider & Ron Van Houten, The Role of Reinforcement in Reducing 
Inappropriate Behavior: Some Myths and Misconceptions, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF 
NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
supra note 56, at 119, 119–22. 
112
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14. 
113
 Donnellan & LaVigna, supra note 105, at 39 (identifying DRO as a positive strategy). 
114
 Mulick, supra note 107, at 394. 
115
 There were similar debates about other intervention techniques. See, e.g., CRIMMINS, supra note 
32, at 24 (time-out may be used, but can be misused if not monitored carefully); Alan C. Repp & Kathryn 
G. Karsh, A Taxonomic Approach to the Nonaversive Treatment of Maladaptive Behavior of Persons with 
Developmental Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE 
INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 331, 332 
(identifying time-out and overcorrection as aversives); Tristan M. Smith, When and When Not to 
Consider the Use of Aversive Interventions in the Behavioral Treatment of Autistic Children, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 287, 288 (time-out and overcorrection differ from 
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labeling behavior interventions as “positive.” 
D.  PBS Evolves into a “Framework” for School-Wide Behavioral Support System 
Although “developed initially as an alternative to [the use of] aversive interventions,”116 
in the 2000s, the PBS movement began to “shift[] focus”117 to become a set of practices and 
systems for school-wide behavioral support for all children.
118
 PBS now encompasses much 
more than a means to devise appropriate interventions to address a single student’s behavioral 
issues.
119
  Rather, PBS is a universal framework through which educators can select and 
implement behavioral practices on a school-wide basis to improve the behavior of all students.
120
 
                                                                                                                                                             
aversives because they do not involve physical punishment); Turnbull, supra note 37, at 479 (setting 
several conditions under which time-out may be acceptable). 
116
 Sugai, supra note 41, at 133.  
117
 George Sugai & Brandi Simonsen, Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports: History, 





 Sugai, supra note 41, at 133 (PBS has grown from “an intervention approach for individual 
students to an intervention approach for entire schools”); see also What is School-Wide Positive Behavior 
Interventions & Supports? OSEP Center on Positive Behav. Interventions & Supports PBIS.ORG (May 
13, 2009) http://www.pbis.org/school/what_is_swpbs.aspx (“More importantly, SWPBS is NOT a 
curriculum, intervention, or practice, but IS a decision making framework that guides selection, 
integration, and implementation of the best evidence-based academic and behavioral practices for 
improving important academic and behavior outcomes for all students.”) (emphasis in original) (typeface 
altered). 
120
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 4–5 (describing PBS as a framework to be implemented on a school-
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System-wide PBS practices include discipline policies, safe-schools initiatives, social-skills 
training programs, and anti-bullying and anti-harassment efforts.
121
 The use of a PBS framework 
in schools is said to provide many benefits that range far beyond the specific occurrence of a 
problem behavior in a particular child with a disability, including improving academic 
achievement school wide (because time devoted to behavioral issues in the classroom is reduced) 
and reducing school violence, bullying, and harassment.
122
  
The current PBS framework takes the entire school community and divides it into three 
“zones” of support. These zones are represented by a pyramid, where the pyramid is divided into 
three areas: (1) primary prevention, (2) secondary prevention, and (3) tertiary prevention.
123
 The 
largest zone, primary prevention, is a school-wide framework for all students and staff and is 
applicable across all school settings.
124
 Secondary prevention efforts are directed at “at-risk” 
students who have not yet begun to engage in problem behaviors.
125
 Tertiary, or “red-zone,” 
prevention strategies are to be implemented for students who currently exhibit problem 
                                                                                                                                                             
wide and community-wide basis); see also Sugai & Simonsen, supra note 117, at 2.  
121
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 38–39. 
122
 Id. at 7.  
123
 The pyramid is displayed at Early Childhood PBIS, PBIS.ORG 
http://www.pbis.org/community/early-childhood (last visited Aug. 31, 2014); Sugai, supra note 41, at 136 
(displaying the pyramid, which divides the school population as follows: eighty to ninety percent of 
students are students without serious problem behaviors, five to fifteen percent of students are “at-risk” 
for problem behaviors, and one to seven percent of students display “chronic/intense” problem behavior).  
124
 Early Childhood PBIS, supra note 123. 
125
 CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 39–40. 




Within this framework, however, very little information is provided to educators about 
specific interventions that are recommended for use with children in the “red zone” who display 
problem behavior. The website of the United States Department of Education’s Office of Special 
Education Programs (OSEP), has a section on the tertiary level of the pyramid that contains only 
very general information about the FBA process and development of BIPs.
127
 Other texts that 
address intervention strategies for children in the “red zone” address only mild behavior 
exhibited by young children.
128
 Indeed, the bulk of the research regarding implementation of the 
PBS pyramidal framework has focused on the primary tier, with the result that the secondary and 
tertiary systems have been demonstrated “solely by very distinct and limited examples.”129 Thus, 
it is somewhat difficult to determine how the PBS framework can operate effectively to aid in 
                                                                                                                                                             
126
 Id. at 40. 
127
 See Tertiary FAQs, PBIS.ORG, http://www.pbis.org/school/tertiary-level/tertiary-faqs (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2014) (explaining the basics of tertiary level prevention through the most frequently asked 
questions). 
128
 See, e.g., LAURA A. RIFFEL, POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT AT THE TERTIARY LEVEL: RED ZONE 
STRATEGIES 47–48, 122, 133–34 (2011) (examples include a young child who burps the alphabet, a 
preschool-aged child who has tantrums, or a kindergarten-aged child who bites other children to gain 
access to toys). 
129
 Terrance M. Scott & Justin Cooper, Tertiary Tier PBIS in Alternative, Residential, and 
Correctional Settings: Considering Intensity in Evidence-based Practice, 36 EDUC. AND TREATMENT 
CHILDREN 3, 102 (2013); Terrance M. Scott et al., Decision-Making in Secondary and Tertiary 
Interventions of School-wide Systems of Positive Behavior Support, 33 EDUC. AND TREATMENT 
CHILDREN 4, 528 (2010). 
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designing appropriate interventions to address the severe self-injurious or aggressive behavior of 
a particular child. 
E.  Professional Responses to the PBS Movement 
The early- to mid-1990s debate about “aversive” versus “positive” interventions was 
highly controversial, leading to shouting matches and other similar behavior.
130
 Some behavior 
analysts accused those in favor of aversive, or punishment-based, interventions of committing 
torture.
131
 Proponents of punishment-based interventions argued that several years of research 
had demonstrated the effectiveness of aversive or punishment-based interventions to reduce 
severe behavior and that it was immoral to forego these effective treatments.
132
 As various 
professional organizations and disability rights groups began to issue position papers on the 
topic, the opposing sides became very entrenched.
133
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 Preface in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR 
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 3, 4, xiii (“At conferences and 
elsewhere, we have seen the issue dissolve into one in which individuals literally deride each other’s 
competence . . . .”). For a highly critical review of the PBS movement, see e.g. Mulick & Butter, supra 
note 107, at 385–404. 
131




 Beginning as early as 1981, both disability-rights and professional scientific organizations issued 
resolutions or other position statements on the ethics of using aversive interventions. In 1981, a disability-
rights organization, The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps (TASH), issued as Resolution on 
the Cessation of Intrusive Interventions. Tash Resolution on Positive Behavioral Supports, TASH.ORG 
(adopted October 1981) (last revised March 2000) http://tash.org/about/resolutions/tash-resolution-
positive-behavioral-supports/. Thereafter, several professional organizations issued position statements 
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Leaving aside the rhetoric, however, the PBS movement is credited with making several 
important contributions to the science of behavioral interventions. First, the PBS movement is 
credited with emphasizing the “systems perspective on problem behaviors,”134 a perspective that 
requires critical analysis of the antecedent environmental conditions that might cause problem 
behavior to occur.
135
 This PBS focus on environmental conditions has led to nearly universal 
acceptance of the FBA process and the development of protocols for conducting FBAs.
136
 The 
PBS movement also spurred research into antecedent-based interventions and other “nonpunitive 
procedures.”137 The PBS movement led to an “explosion” of research regarding both antecedent-
based interventions and reinforcement-based (as opposed to punishment-based) interventions.
138
  
The PBS movement also spurred a critical debate about the interplay between the 
effectiveness of interventions and the humane treatment of disabled individuals. Over the years, 
this focus on the treatment acceptability of interventions caused several professionals in the field 
to reexamine their own views about the circumstances, if any, under which certain behavioral 
interventions are appropriate.
139
 Surveys of professional behavior analysts, whether they are PBS 
                                                                                                                                                             
that took varying positions on the ethics of using aversive interventions. Seiden & Zirkel, supra note 78, 
at 1030–31; Singh, supra note 56, apps. A–E. 
134






 Feldman, supra note 63, at 263. 
138
 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 414. 
139
 See Fredda Brown, et. al. Personal Paradigm Shifts Among ABA and PBS Experts: Comparisons 
in Treatment Acceptability, 10 J. BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 212, 218 (2008) (survey of both ABA and PBS 
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proponents or not, indicate that behavior analysts have increased their use of positive-based 
interventions and decreased their use of punishment-based interventions from earlier decades.
140
  
And yet there are several criticisms of a PBS, or “positive-only,” approach to behavioral 
interventions. First, critics note that some children demonstrate severe behavior at such a high 
rate of frequency that it is difficult to find appropriate behaviors that can be “positively” 
reinforced, with the result that children cannot be engaged in any meaningful learning until the 
interfering behaviors are reduced by punishment.
141
 Indeed, for individuals whose problem 
behavior is a function of automatic reinforcement, such as sensory stimulation, a reinforcement-
only intervention may not be effective because the external reinforcer being delivered (a toy or 




                                                                                                                                                             
experts indicated that the acceptability of punishment-based interventions declined over time); Craig A. 
Michaels, et. al., Personal Paradigm Shifts in PBS Experts: Perception of Treatment Acceptability of 
Decelerative Consequence-Based Behavioral Procedures, 7 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 93, 93–
94 (2005) (survey of PBS experts indicated that acceptability of punishment-based interventions declined 
between 1970s and 1990s). 
140
 Brown, supra note 139, at 218 (survey of both ABA and PBS experts); Michaels, supra note 139, 
at 93–94 (survey of PBS experts). 
141
 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 417 (“[S]everal studies with autistic children show that 
learning may be very slow and unstable due to the interference of problem behaviors . . . over a long 
period of time. Progress does not improve for some children until interfering behaviors are reduced by 
punishment.”).  
142
 Roscoe, supra note 36, at 636 (“One possible explanation for the limited effectiveness of DRO and 
DRA procedures with individuals who engage in stereotypic behavior is that stimulation produced by the 
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In addition, many behavioral analysts, whether pro-PBS or not, agree that an optimal 
intervention plan for many disabled individuals with severe behavior may require a combination 
of both reinforcement-based and punishment-based interventions.
143
 Indeed, there is a wealth of 
research that demonstrates that “[t]he combination of reinforcement and punishment is superior 
to reinforcement alone.”144 Depending on the particular individual, “reinforcement-based 
interventions may be ineffective without the use of extinction or punishment.”145 Thus, effective 
treatment for some individuals might require a “multicomponent approach to intervention”146 
                                                                                                                                                             
behavior is continuously available.”); Thompson, supra note 73, at 322 (In a study of three individuals 
with self-injurious behavior, “[r]einforcement alone did not result in a decrease” of the behavior).  
143
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 6 (“[F]or many years, it has been considered a best practice to 
accompany the use of aversives with a detailed . . . plan that embodies the major features of PBS”); 
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 11 (“Punishment as [c]orrective [f]eedback [h]as a [p]lace in [p]ositive 
[i]nterventions”); Singh, supra note 56, at 4 (“Some form of contingent aversive stimulation, together 
with a positive reinforcement program, may be used to control the behavior if it is life-threatening to the 
individual.”). Indeed, the Guidelines issued by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board require that, 
whenever punishment procedures are deemed necessary, the behavior analyst must “always include[] 
reinforcement procedures for alternative behavior[s].” BACB Guidelines, supra note 61. 
144
 Saul Axelrod, Myths That (Mis)guide Our Profession, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF 
NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
supra note 56, at 59, 62–63 (reviewing the literature); Hagopian, supra note 73, at 224–25 (Severe 
behavior decreased at greatest frequency when functional communication training, a position 
intervention, was paired with punishment procedures.). 
145
 Thompson, supra note 73, at 317. 
146
 Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 9. 
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that would include “non-PBS strategies.”147 A multicomponent intervention plan that applies 
both reinforcement-based and punishment-based interventions together can effectively reduce 
the frequency of severe behavior and allow individuals whose behavior caused their admission to 




Another criticism of the PBS movement stems from the difficulty of labeling any 
particular interventions as “positive” or “aversive.” Indeed, one commentator noted that, as the 
PBS movement began to take hold, “[p]rocedures [that were] deemed aversive by some people in 
policy-making roles began to include various relatively mild procedures, just as many behavior 
analysts had originally feared.”149 The DRA/DRO debate is just one example of the difficulty of 
using subjective terms like “positive” to describe a particular form of intervention. The need to 
identify certain approaches as “positive” to be “consumer friendly” has been derided by some.150 
Others note that a potentially ominous side effect of over-labeling interventions as prohibited 
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 Id.; see also Gregory P. Hanley, et. al., On the Effectiveness of and Preference for Punishment and 
Extinction Components of Function-Based Interventions, 38 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 51, 52 (2005) 
(stating that “function-based treatments” “may not be effective for all individuals”); Lerman & Vorndran, 
supra note 16, at 432 (discussing the common treatment that “may in fact reduce problem behavior 
through the mechanism of punishment”). 
148
 See Page, supra note 71, at 42–43 (detailing the results of behavior interventions plans in assisting 
disabled children and adults in moving from highly restrictive institutional settings to less restrictive 
settings, including community group home living).  
149
 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 415.  
150
 Hanley, supra note 147, at 51. 
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“aversive” interventions may be the increased use of medication to control problem behavior.151 
Finally, some commentators note that structuring the environment of a disabled 
individual in a way that eliminates all punishment-based consequences ignores the reality of 
life.
152
 Punishment is a natural consequence of life,
153
 and a “totally non-aversive approach 
would constitute poor preparation for a [disabled individual] transitioning to an ordinary 
community residential or work setting.”154 Rather, behavioral interventions based on punishment 
can play a vital role in preparing disabled individuals to understand the demands of community 
living and be successful in that context.
155
 
F.  Current Punishment-Based Interventions 
Without doubt, the PBS movement caused behavior analysts to reexamine moral and 
ethical issues surrounding the use of punishment-based interventions.
156
 Some behavior analysts 
articulated a need for further research into the proper role of punishment as a means to address 
problem behavior.
157
 Others declared that procedures such as “water squirts, ammonia capsules, 
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 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 415. 
152
 Robert H. Horner, On.the Status of Knowledge for Using Punishment: A Commentary, 35 J. 
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 465, 465 (2002); Lerman & Vorndran, supra note 16, at 447, 457. 
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 Horner, supra note 152, at 465. 
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 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 417. 
155
 Axelrod, supra note 144, at 60. 
156
 Brown, supra note 139, at 213 (surveying experts in the field on the issue of treatment 
acceptability of various interventions); Michaels, supra note 139, at 93. 
157
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 353 (“More [r]esearch on [p]unishment [i]s [n]eeded.”); Lerman, supra 
note 16, at 431. 
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pinching, and hair pulling, have . . . become unacceptable in virtually all settings.”158 The current 
edition of a leading ABA text states that behavioral interventions must be physically safe for the 
child and caregivers and “contain no elements that are degrading or disrespectful to 
participants.”159  
Punishment-based interventions discussed in the current literature do not include the 
aversive therapies described in the early literature, with the exception of contingent electric 
shock.
160
 A common punishment-based intervention is a verbal reprimand, made in close 
proximity to the student and delivered with eye contact while firmly grasping the student’s 
shoulders.
161
 Another punishment-based intervention is response blocking, when a behavior is 
physically interrupted as it begins.
162
 Response blocking is effective in reducing problem 
behaviors such as hand mouthing or eye poking.
163
 A third punishment-based intervention is 
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 Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 410. 
159
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 350. Treatment must be “(a) designed for therapeutic effectiveness, (b) 
delivered in a compassionate and caring manner, (c) assessed formatively to determine effectiveness and 
terminated if effectiveness is not demonstrated, and (d) sensitive and responsive to the overall physical, 
psychological, and social needs of the person.” Id. 
160
 Contingent electric shock can be delivered either by device worn on the head, arm or leg that 
delivers low-level electric stimulation for up to two seconds. Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t., No. 8:10-
cv-036, 2010 WL 3418424 at *1, n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug, 10, 2010); COOPER, supra note 21, at 344. The use 
of such devices, which are deemed to be medical devices, has been cleared by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Bryant, 2010 WL 3418424 at *1, n.3. 
161
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 338–39. 
162
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 339. 
163
 Id. 
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contingent exercise, where the child who engages in problem behavior might be required to stand 
up and sit down ten times.
164
 A fourth punishment-based intervention is overcorrection, which 




Other punishment-based interventions use negative punishment techniques, where 
reinforcement is discontinued when problem behavior occurs. One such method is “time-out,” in 
which a child who has displayed problem behavior loses the ability to earn reinforcement for a 
period of time.
166
 A related method of negative punishment is “response cost,” which is akin to a 
fine.
167
 Response cost provides a definite amount of lost reinforcement as a consequence of 
engaging in problem behavior.
168
  
Contingent electric shock is still discussed as a form of punishment, although the ethical 
and moral concerns are noted, and electric shock is described as the methodology that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
164
 Id. at 341. 
165
 Id. at 342–44; Singh, supra note 56, at 5. 
166
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 357–63; Singh, supra note 56 at 5. 
167
 COOPER, supra note 21, at 363–64. 
168
 Id. at 364–65. There also is an intervention technique known as “extinction” that does not fall 
neatly into either the reinforcement or punishment category. Extinction is used to remove any 
reinforcement that previously encouraged or maintained problem behavior. Extinction removes any 
reinforcement that may have existed in the environment before interventions were implemented. For 
example, if behavior served the function of gaining attention, extinction would eliminate all forms of 
attention for that behavior. Id. at 457. 
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“practitioner turns to when all other methods have failed.”169  
Recent studies of ABA and PBS experts demonstrate that, although the two groups do 
rank the acceptability of punishment-based interventions differently, the differences are not as 
stark as the previously robust debate might have indicated. A survey of PBS experts indicated 
that three-quarters of the PBS experts would employ interventions using extinction or mild 
reprimand.
170
 Sixty percent of PBS experts surveyed would recommend an intervention using 
response cost.
171
 Fifteen percent of PBS experts stated that they would recommend 
overcorrection as an intervention.
172
 9.7% of PBS experts indicated that they would, under 
appropriate circumstances, recommend the use of contingent electric shock.
173
 
The ABA experts indicated a greater willingness to recommend any of the punishment-
based interventions, although only slightly more than one-quarter of ABA experts indicated that 
they would recommend contingent electric shock.
174
 
III. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
A.  History 
Before 1975, disabled children had no uniform right to attend public school throughout 
the United States.
175
 After the Supreme Court determined in Brown v. Board of Education
176
 that 
                                                                                                                                                             
169
 Id. at 353. 
170








 Brown, supra note 139, at 217. 
175
 See generally Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A 
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racially segregated education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,
177
 advocates for the disabled began to assert that children with disabilities also were 
entitled to an equal educational opportunity.
178
 Yet even following the decision in Brown, 
judicial decisions and state statutes specifically allowed public schools to keep disabled children 
who were deemed “‘uneducable’”179 from attending public school.180 
More than a decade after the Court’s decision in Brown, Congress enacted the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided grants to school districts that 
voluntarily provided special education services.
181
 In 1973, Congress enacted Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, a general civil rights statute that prohibited discrimination against the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355–56 (1990). 
176
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
177
 Id. at 495. 
178
 Advocate for the disabled successfully argued in two landmark cases decided in the early 1970s 
that children with disabilities were entitled to equal access to public education. See e.g., Mills v. Bd. of 
Ed. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75, 878 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children 
v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC]. 
179
 See, PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282 n.3 (quoting a Pennsylvania statute that permitted a school district 
to exclude a child from school based on the opinion of the school psychologist that the child was 
“‘uneducable and untrainable’”).  
180
 See Weber, supra note 175, at 355–56 (detailing various judicial decisions and state statutes that 
excluded children with disabilities from public school). 
181
 Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 201, 79 Stat. 27, 27 (1965). 
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disabled by any organization or entity that received federal assistance.
182
 Neither of these laws, 
however, required that disabled children receive a public education.
183
 
Federal funding for special education first occurred in 1975, when Congress passed the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).
184
 The EAHCA conditioned the states’ 
receipt of federal funds upon compliance with the statute’s requirement that each child with 
disability receive a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE.185 In 1990, Congress 
reauthorized the EAHCA with several substantive amendments, including renaming the statute 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
186
 IDEA was again reauthorized and 
amended in both 1997 and 2004.
187
 
Because IDEA is a federal funding statute, states that receive IDEA funds are required to 
comply with the statutory scheme, including creating policies and procedures that will 
implement the requirements of IDEA.
188
 The states also must monitor schools’ compliance with 
the statute.
189
 IDEA does allow the states to determine certain policies or procedures that are 
                                                                                                                                                             
182
 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988)). 
183
 For a discussion of early federal legislative initiatives and voluntary efforts undertaken by various 
states to educate children with disabilities, see Weber, supra note 175, at 357–58. 
184
 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 775 (1975). 
185
 Id. at 780. 
186
 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990). 
187
 Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2467 (2004); Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). 
188
 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
189
 See id. §1412 (a)(1)(A), (4), (5)(A), (11) (setting forth conditions under which states are eligible 
for funding).  
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necessary to implement IDEA, but except as to those identified matters, the states must conform 
to the provisions of IDEA.
190




B.  Critical Provisions of IDEA 
From the time of its initial passage in 1975 through the present, IDEA has contained 
certain fundamental principles that govern the provision of special education to disabled 
children. The first fundamental principle is that the educational goal is very broad. In 
reauthorizing IDEA in 2004, Congress articulated a “national policy of ensuring equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals 
with disabilities.”192 The educational goal for children with disabilities stretches far beyond the 
“3 R’s” of reading, writing, and “’rithmetic.”193   The goal is to prepare children with disabilities 




A second governing principle of IDEA is the requirement that each child with a disability 
                                                                                                                                                             
190
 Examples include such choices as to whether a foster parent may act as a parent for IDEA 
purposes or whether the state will implement a single-tier or two-tiered administrative process to resolve 
disputes. See id. §1401(23) (defining a foster parent as a parent for purposes of the statute); id. 
§1415(f)(1)(A) (2012) (detailing due process procedures available to parents or the local educational 
agency to ensure compliance with the statute). 
191
 Turnbull, supra note 37, at 478. 
192
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). 
193
 See generally id. § 1400(c)(5). 
194
 Id. § 1400(c)(1), (d)(1)(A). 
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receive a FAPE.
195
 In its 1983 decision in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court 
addressed the critical question of how to measure whether a proposed educational program 
constituted an “appropriate” education for a particular child.196 In Rowley, the parents of a deaf 
child sought to have their public school district provide the child with a sign language interpreter 
in all academic classes.
197
 After the school district refused to do so, the parents initiated 




The parents then filed suit in federal district court.
199
 The district court disagreed with the 
findings at the administrative level below and concluded that the school district’s proposals did 
not provide the child with a FAPE.
200
 In so holding, the court defined an “appropriate education” 
as one that provided the disabled child with an “opportunity to achieve his [or her] full potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
195
 Id. at § 1400(d)(1)(A). A FAPE is defined as special education services that (a) “[a]re provided at 
public expense, under public supervision and direction . . .” (b) “[m]eet the standards of the SEA . . .”; (c) 
“[i]nclude an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State 
involved; and” (d) conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 34 C.F.R. §300.17 
(2012).  
196
 Bd. of Educ.of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). 
197
 Id. at 184. 
198
 Id. at 185. 
199
 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 154; Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F. 
Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter District-level Rowley] 
200
 District-level Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 536. 
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commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”201 After the Second Circuit 




The Court first determined that the FAPE requirement had both a substantive and a 
procedural aspect.
203
 As to the substantive aspect, the Court rejected the district court’s standard 
for measuring an appropriate education.
204
 Deeming the district court’s holding as a requirement 
that the educational program “maximize the potential”205 of a disabled child, the Court instead 
chose a far lower threshold.
206
 Defining its standard as a “basic floor of opportunity,”207 the 
Court held that an appropriate education is one that is “individually designed to provide 
                                                                                                                                                             
201
 Id. at 534. The district court in Rowley articulated a number of potential definitions of an 
appropriate education. Id. The court noted that an appropriate education “could mean an ‘adequate’ 
education” that would do no more than allow a child to progress from grade to grade and meet the 
minimum requirements to earn a high school diploma. Id. The court also stated that an appropriate 
education “could also mean one which enables the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential.” 
Id. The court characterized its view as a standard somewhere between the measure of “adequate” and 
“achiev[ing] his or her full potential.” Id. The district court’s standard has been referred to as the 
“proportional maximization standard.” Mark C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate 
Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 95, 96 (2012). 
202
 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186, 210. 
203
 Id. at 189. 
204
 Id.at 189–90. 
205
 Id. at 189. 
206
 Id. at 200. 
207
 Id. at 201. 
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educational benefit to the handicapped child.”208 The Court then concluded that the services 
provided by the school district were sufficient to confer “educational benefit” on the child and, 
thus, the district had provided a FAPE.
209
 The Court also determined that the procedural aspect 
of the FAPE requirement is satisfied when the child and his or her parents are afforded all of 
IDEA’s procedural requirements for notice and parental participation in the process of 
developing the child’s educational plan.210 
 A third governing principle of special education is that each disabled child has an 
individualized educational program (IEP).
211
 The IEP is a written document that sets forth the 
“specially designed instruction”212 that will meet that particular child’s unique needs.  IDEA 




 Id. at 201, 210. The Court recognized that the phrase “educational benefit” was a flexible concept 
that would depend in large part on the nature and severity of each child’s disability. Id. at 202. Indeed, the 
Court explicitly declined to establish a single test by which the adequacy of an educational benefit would 
be measured. Id. Although the Court explicitly confined its analysis to the facts of the particular case 
before it, the decision has been universally interpreted as creating a standard to be applied in all cases. See 
Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to 
a Free and Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 
503, 504 n.5 (2011) (“It is clear from the decision itself that the Rowley Court intended only to articulate a 
framework for analyzing whether Amy Rowley had been provided a FAPE,” but “[n]otwithstanding this 
disclaimer, the Rowley Court’s analysis has been uniformly cited by courts throughout the nation as a 
standard for determining whether a FAPE has been provided.”). 
210
 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209. 
211
 Id. at 181–82. 
212
 The federal regulations define “specially designed instruction” as “adapting, as appropriate to the 
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contains very detailed provisions about the composition of a child’s IEP team, the contents of the 
IEP, the process by which an IEP is developed, and the parties’ rights to seek administrative and 
judicial review in the event of a disagreement.
213
 The IEP document has been described as the 
“cornerstone” of the disabled child’s right to an education.214  
As a corollary to the right to an IEP designed to meet the child’s unique needs, the child 
is entitled to receive educational services in the least restrictive environment
215
 that will allow 
the child to learn. Special education does not occur only in a public school building; if a child’s 
unique needs require that the child be placed in either a private day school or a residential 
                                                                                                                                                             
needs of an eligible child . . . the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction.” 34 C.F.R. 
§300.39(b)(3) (2012). 
213
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)-(4) (2012). The IEP must contain the following information: (a) the child’s 
present levels of performance; (b) a description of annual goals and objectives for the child’s educational 
performance; (c) a means to “measure” whether the child has attained the prescribed goals and objectives; 
(d) the methods by which educators will report on the child’s progress towards meeting goals and 
objectives; (e) a statement of the specific special educations services and supplementary aids and supports 
that the child will receive; and (f) a statement as to the extent to which the child will not participate with 
typically developing peers in the general education classroom or activities, among other information. Id. § 
1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–VI) (2012). 
214
 See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“The cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP.”); Tenn. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul 
B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The development and implementation of the IEP are the 
cornerstones of the Act.”) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). 
215
 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
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facility, such a placement must be made at public expense.
216
 When a child is placed in a private 
school by a public agency, that school must conform to all of the requirements of IDEA.
217
 
Finally, when it passed the EAHCA in 1975, Congress also recognized that children with 
disabilities and their parents needed robust due process protections to ensure that schools would 
fully implement the statute’s requirements.218 Prior to 1975, when a school district excluded a 
child from public school on grounds that the child was “uneducable,” parents had no notice or 
opportunity to challenge the school district’s decision to exclude the child from school.219 
Congress remedied that circumstance by giving parents several vitally important due process 
rights.
220
 These “procedural protections created powerful tools for parents as they advocated for 
                                                                                                                                                             
216
 See id. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (addressing placement of children in private schools by public agencies). 
217
 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(B)(i). See also Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational 
Agencies and Special Education: Obligations and Liabilities, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 62, 73 (2000) 
(discussing IDEA’s requirement that children placed in private schools at public expense receive a 
FAPE). 
218
 Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)–(c), 89 Stat. 773, 788–89 (1975). 
219
 See Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“It 
is not disputed that prior to this suit, parents of retarded children who are plaintiffs were not afforded a 
hearing or, in many instances, even notice of their child's exclusion from public school”); Weber, supra 
note 175, at 358 (Prior to the passage of the EAHCA, “state legislation frequently lacked enforcement 
mechanisms that parents could use if their children were wrongfully denied educational services”). 
220
 These due process rights “f[a]ll into four broad categories: notice, consent, participation, and 
challenge.” Julie F. Mead &Mark A. Paige Parents as Advocates: Examining the History and Evolution 
of Parents’ Rights to Advocate for Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 34 J. LEGIS. 123, 125–26 
(2008). 
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access to public education for their children with disabilities.”221 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Rowley recognized that these “elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards” reflect the 
great importance that Congress placed on parental participation in all aspects of the child’s 
educational planning and progress.
222
 The extensive and detailed procedural protections afforded 
to disabled children, and their parents acting as advocates for their children, are another 
fundamental principle of special education.   
C.  The 1997 and 2004 Amendments to IDEA 
Before 1997, IDEA lacked any provisions regarding behavioral interventions to address 
problem behavior that might impede a disabled child’s ability to learn.  Beginning as early as 
1987, however, the federal government began to appropriate funds to research “non-aversive” or 
“positive” approaches to manage behavior of children and adults with disabilities. In 1987, the 
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR) awarded a grant of several 
hundred thousand dollars to university researchers to study “‘Nonaversive Behavior 
Management.’”223 In 1990, Congress amended the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act to provide funds for research about “positive behavior management programs” 
that might improve the lives of individuals with disabilities.
224
 When Congress again amended 
the same Act in 1994, Congress authorized the Department of Education to award grants for 
                                                                                                                                                             
221
 Id. at 127. 
222
 Bd. of Educ.of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982). 
223
 J.M. Johnston et al., Positive Behavior Support and Applied Behavior Analysis, 29 THE BEHAV. 
ANALYST 51, 53 (2006). 
224
 Pub. L. No. 101-496 § 17, 104 Stat. 1191, 1200, 1202 (1990). 
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research into the use of “positive behavioral supports” to support individuals with disabilities.225  
Similarly, in 1991, the Department of Education issued several funding priorities, 
pursuant to its authority under Section 204 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for research that 
would “lead to the development of methods, procedures, and devices that will benefit individuals 
with disabilities, especially those with the most severe disabilities.”226 From 1991 to 1997, the 
Department of Education repeatedly articulated one of its funding priorities to be research into 
the use of “positive intervention strategies” to address “excess behaviors” in disabled 
individuals.
227
 Indeed, in 1996, OSEP established a “Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions 
and Supports.”228 
                                                                                                                                                             
225
 Pub. L. No. 103-230 § 152, 108 Stat. 284, 321–322 (1994).  
226
 Proposed Funding Priorities for the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research 
for Fiscal Years 1992–93, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,280 (Nov. 18, 1991). 
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 See e.g., Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Notice of Proposed Priorities, 62 
Fed. Reg. 13,972, 13,974 (Mar. 24, 1997); Department of Education Notice Inviting Applications for 
New Awards for Fiscal Year 1996, 60 Fed. Reg. 47830–32 (Sept. 14, 1995); Department of Education 
Notice of Final Priority for Fiscal Years 1994–1995, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,370, 53,370–71 (Oct. 14, 1993); 
Notice of Final Funding Priorities for the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research for 
Fiscal Years 1992–93, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,288, 14,294–95 (Apr. 17, 1992). In May 1997, before the passage 
of the 1997 amendments to IDEA, the Department of Education issued a notice regarding the availability 
of grants to fund research to examine the use of “non-aversive interventions” to reduce or “eliminate 
severe problem behaviors” in children with disabilities. Notice of Final Funding Priorities for Fiscal 
Years 1997–1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,760, 25,767 (May 9, 1997).  
228
 See Positive Behavior Interventions & Supports, PBIS.ORG, http://www.pbis.org  (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2014) (describing the program and its purpose). The pbis.org website describes the purpose of 
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When Congress amended IDEA in 1997, it added language about the use of behavioral 
interventions to treat problematic behavior. The 1997 amendments amended 20 U.S.C. Section 
1414(d)(3)(B)(i) to require that a child’s IEP team consider a variety of “special factors” that 
might adversely affect the child’s educational performance.229 One of those special factors was 
the circumstance where a child’s behavior might impede the child’s learning.230 The statute 
provided that the IEP team should consider “strategies, including positive behavioral 
interventions, strategies, and supports to address” problematic behavior.231 
 Congress’s intent in inserting this language into IDEA cannot be determined. The 
legislative history, including the House and Senate reports, does not reveal any discussion by 
Congress about the reasons why this language was inserted into the statute.
232
 The House and 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports as “giv[ing] schools capacity-building 
information and technical assistance for identifying, adapting, and sustaining effective school-wide 
disciplinary practices.” Supporting District Structures & Teams through a State-Level Plan Power Point 
found at http://www.pbis.org/presentations/chicago-forum-09 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). According to 
the Department of Education, “the Center has two foci: (1) Broad dissemination to schools, families, and 
communities [that the] technology of school-wide positive behavioral interventions and support exists; 
and (2) Demonstrations at the level of individual students, schools, districts, and states that school-wide 
positive behavioral interventions and support are feasible and effective.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Other 
Sites: Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, ED.gov, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/contacts/gen/othersites/specedrs.html. (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). 
229






 See S. REP. NO. 105-17, (1997), available at 1997 WL 244967; H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, (1997), 
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Senate reports also are silent on the topic. The term “positive behavioral interventions” is not 




 The ability of school officials to discipline children with disabilities was a hot-button 
issue at the time, and the 1997 amendments did add procedures to address the discipline issue.
234
 
Indeed, the provisions regarding discipline provide the most detailed references to behavioral 
intervention techniques. Under the 1997 amendments, school officials were required to 
determine whether the behavior leading to disciplinary measures previously had been the subject 
of an FBA or a BIP.
235
 If not, the child’s IEP team was to convene and consider whether an FBA 
should be conducted and a BIP implemented.
236
 While the statutory provisions regarding 
discipline do not use the term “positive behavioral interventions or supports,” they are the only 
provisions in IDEA that refer to FBAs and BIPs. 
Congress again reauthorized and amended IDEA in 2004.
237
 At that time, Congress 
                                                                                                                                                             
available at 1997 WL 258948 (providing no discussion of the language); Turnbull supra note 37, at 449–
50 (discussing lack of insight into Congress’s motives in including the language).  
233
 Turnbull, supra note 37, at 449–50. The implementing regulations appeared at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 
(1999). The comments to the implementing regulations appeared at 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,406 (Mar. 12, 
1999). 
234




 Id. If the child’s behavior previously had been the subject of an FBA and implementation of a BIP, 
the team was to consider whether the BIP should be modified. Id. 
237
 Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (later codified at 20 U.S.C. §1400 et. seq. (2006)). 
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amended the language of Section 1414(d)(B)(3)(i) slightly. The statute now provides that “in the 
case of a child whose behavior impedes” learning, the child’s IEP team shall “consider the use of 
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.”238  
Congress also amended the provisions relating to discipline of a disabled child, but without 




As was true in 1997, the legislative history of the 2004 amendments do not demonstrate 
that Congress intended to limit behavioral interventions to “positive” interventions or otherwise 
ban the use of non-positive interventions. The Senate’s Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pension did hear testimony about the use of behavioral supports in school in a hearing 
entitled “IDEA: Behavioral Supports in School.”240 The main focus of the hearing, however, was 
the issue of whether IDEA’s current disciplinary process “force[d] schools to keep disruptive, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although IDEA has not undergone any substantive revisions since 2004, the statutory provisions were 
amended slightly in 2010 as part of an effort by Congress to substitute the terms “intellectual disability” 
and “individual with an intellectual disability” for terms “mental retardation” or “mentally retarded 
individual,” respectively, wherever those terms appeared in any federal statute. See Pub. L. No. 111-256, 
124 Stat. 2643 (2010). 
238
 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(B)(3)(B)(i) (2012). A November 2003 Senate report on the 2004 amendments 
to IDEA identify research conducted by OSEP as demonstrating that the use of positive behavioral 
interventions can reduce the incidence of significant behavioral problems See S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 22, 
(2003) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt185/pdf/CRPT-108srpt185.pdf. 
239
 20 U.S.C. §1415(k) et seq. 
240
 S. REP. NO. 108-185 (2003), at 3.  
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aggressive, and violent children in regular classrooms.”241 One of the witnesses was Dr. George 
Sugai; at the time of the hearing, Dr. Sugai was a member of the faculty at the University of 
Oregon and a Co-Director of the National Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and 
Supports, the OSEP-funded PBIS Center.
242
 Dr. Sugai’s testimony focused on “schoolwide 
positive behavioral supports”243 and did not provide any detail about the means by which 
positive-only behavioral interventions might be implemented in a BIP to address a particular 
child’s behavior.244  
The Senate Report that accompanied the Senate bill does state the opinion of the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions that, “in most cases,” positive behavior 
supports and interventions can reduce problematic behavior.
245
 That statement, however, is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
241
 Examining the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
Focusing on Behavioral Support in Schools to Ensure Safe Schools for Students and Teachers While 
Protecting the Rights of Students with Disabilities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 4 ([2d Sess.] 2002) (statements of Senator Jeff Sessions) [hereinafter 
IDEA Senate Hearing]. 
242
 IDEA Senate Hearing, supra note 241, at 9 (testimony of George Sugai,) (information introduced 
by the Chairman). 
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 IDEA Senate Hearing, supra note 241, at 32 (testimony of George Sugai). 
244
 Members of Congress cited Dr. Sugai’s testimony on the topic of using positive behavioral 
supports on a schoolwide basis to reduce disciplinary problems, but not on the topic of appropriate 
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S11546 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statements of Senator Ted Kennedy); IDEA, Statements of Tom 
Harkin, 150 CONG. REC. S11850 (daily ed.Nov. 24, 2004) (statements of Tom Harkin). 
245
 S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 32 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
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accompanied by any further details that would illuminate the Committee’s opinion. In addition, 
the House Conference Report released just before Congress voted on the 2004 amendments does 
not contain any discussion of the relative merits of positive behavioral interventions or any 
proposed ban on the use of aversive interventions.
246
  
The 2004 Amendments did add certain references to positive behavioral interventions 
and supports in other sections of IDEA. In the “Findings and Purposes” section of the statute, 
                                                                                                                                                             
108srpt185/pdf/CRPT-108srpt185.pdf. The 2004 amendments to IDEA began as House Bill 1350. The 
Senate bill was Senate Bill 1248. Both bills contained the identical language about the use of “positive 
behavioral interventions or other strategies” to address problematic behavior. The House Report that 
accompanied House Bill 1350 had no specific comments on the language. The Senate Report that 
accompanied Senate Bill 1248 stated: 
The committee has heard a great deal from professionals about the behavior of students 
with disabilities, the danger posed by some behavior, and the effect that behavior has on 
the learning environment. The committee believes that, in most cases, the behavior of 
students can be addressed and prevented effectively through positive behavioral 
interventions and supports. Therefore, section 614(d)(3)(B)(i) requires IEP teams to 
provide positive behavioral interventions and supports for children with disabilities 
whose behavior impedes their learning or the learning of others. The committee believes 
that taking this proactive approach should result in reductions in behavior problems and 
disciplinary referrals, as well as improved educational results for students with 
disabilities. 
 
S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 32. 
246
 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-779 (2004), available at 2004 WL 2711859 (providing no 
discussion of the merits). Some commentators contend that IDEA’s language accords “preferred status” to 
positive behavioral interventions and supports. See CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 6 (discussing the 
references to PBS in the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA); Turnbull, supra note 37, at 462 (noting that the 
“IDEA” creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of positive behavioral intervention sand supports”) 
(typeface altered). 
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Congress stated that research demonstrated the education of children with disabilities “can be 
made more effective by,” among other things, providing positive behavioral interventions and 
supports.
247
 Congress also authorized funding to train school personnel in the use of positive 
behavioral supports and interventions.
248
 
D.  Federal Legislative Proposals to Define and Regulate Aversive Behavioral Interventions 
In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress that would address the use 
of aversive behavioral interventions in an educational setting. In December 2009, a bill was 
introduced both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, that proposed 
federal legislation to regulate the use of seclusion and restraint in schools.
249
 The Senate and 
House bills both would prohibit the use of “aversive behavioral interventions that [would] 
compromise [the] health and safety”250 of students, although such aversive behavioral 
interventions are not defined. Rather, each bill proposed to have the Secretary of Education 
promulgate regulations that would set standards for the use of, among other items, “aversive 
behavioral interventions.”251 The House bill was passed in the House of Representatives and was 
sent to the Senate, where both bills then were referred to the Senate’s Committee on Health, 
                                                                                                                                                             
247
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(F) (2012). 
248
 See, e.g., id. §§ 1462(a)(6), 1465(b)(1)(B). 
249
 Keeping All Student Safe Act, H.R. 4247, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4247rfs/pdf/BILLS-111hr4247rfs.pdf; Preventing Harmful 
Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act, S. 2860, 111th Cong (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s2860is/pdf/BILLS-111s2860is.pdf. 
250
 H.R. 4247 §3(3)(B); S. 2680 §(3)(3)(B). 
251
 H.R. 4247 §5(a)(1)(D); S. 2680 §5(a)(1)(D). 
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Education, Labor and Pensions.
252
 
In both 2012 and 2013, the House bill was re-introduced in the House.
253
 In July 2013, 




IV. STATE REGULATIONS ON THE USE OF AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS 
In the years since IDEA first included the term “positive behavioral interventions and 
supports,” some states have taken action either at the legislative or regulatory level to address the 
use of aversive interventions in an educational setting. Currently twelve states and the District of 
Columbia have statutes or regulations that address the use of aversive interventions, procedures, 
or techniques at school.
255
 These statutes and regulations vary widely both in defining aversive 
                                                                                                                                                             
252
 Bill Summary & Status of H.R. 4247, 111th Cong. Major Congressional Actions (2009–2010),THE 
LIBRARY OF CONG. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04247:@@@R (last visited Aug. 
31, 2014). 
253
 Keeping All Students Safe Act, H.R. 1381, 112th Cong. (2011); Keeping All Students Safe Act, 
H.R. 1893, 113th Cong. (2013) (bill summary and status available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.01893). 
254
 H.R. 1893 (bill summary and status available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c113:H.R.1893).  
255
 CAL EDUC. CODE. §§ 56520, 56521.2 (2013); D.C. CODE §§ 38-2561.01, 38-2561.03 (West 
WestlawNext current through Feb. 21, 2014); 704 Ky. Admin. Regs. §7:160 (2013), 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/kar/704/007/160.htm; 05-071 Code Me. R. §§ 2(1), 6(2)(F) (2013), 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/05/chaps05.htm; Mont. Admin. R. 10.16.3346 (2013), 
http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/Print_RV.Asp?RV=30430; N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs tit. 8,.§§ 
19.5(b), 200.22(e) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.521–388.5317, 449.765–449.786, 394.353–
 
  53 
interventions and regulating their use.
256
  
                                                                                                                                                             
394.379 (2013) (public instruction; hospitals and mental health facilities; and private educational 
institutions, respectively); N.H. Code R. Ed. 1113.04–1113.15, 1114.07–1114.22 (2013) (district-run 
programs and non-public programs, respectively); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-391.1 (2011); Ohio 
Admin. Code 3301-35-15 (2013), http://codes.ohio.gov/oac/3301-35-15; 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.133, 711.46 
(2008) (applicable to special education services and programs generally and to charter schools and 
cyberschools); Wash. Admin. Code. § 392-172A-03120(1)–(2) (2013), 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=392-172A-03120; 5-42 Wyo. Code R. § 6 (LexisNexis 
2013). Conn. Agencies Regs. §17a-227-1(c). 
256
 Two states, Delaware and Connecticut, have regulations that ban the use of “aversive techniques” 
in nonpublic schools, but the term “aversive techniques” is not defined anywhere in the regulations. See 
16-Del. Admin. Code. 3320-20.11.13 (2014); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17a-238-10 (2014) (prohibiting the 
use of aversive techniques in “residential schools”); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17a-227-1(aa) (2014) 
(defining residential schools). Although the term “aversive techniques” is not defined, the Connecticut 
regulations define an “aversive procedure” as “the planned use of an event which may be unpleasant, 
noxious, or otherwise cause discomfort, to alter the occurrence of a specific behavior or to protect an 
individual from injuring himself or others.” Conn. Agencies Regs. §17a-227-1(c). This defined term is 
not applied anywhere in the regulations. 
Rhode Island’s regulations also contain a definition of “aversive interventions/strategies” in 
regulations governing the use of seclusion and restraint, but the definition is not applied in any other 
regulation. 21-2 R.I. Code R. §§ 39:3.2, 39:3.20 (LexisNexis 2013) (including the definitions section and 
noting that the provisions governing physical restraint do not apply the definition of aversive 
interventions or strategies). 
Several states have provisions that govern the use of seclusion (sometimes called time-out) and 
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Pennsylvania’s regulations, entitled “Positive Behavioral Support,” state that positive, not 
negative, measures should form the basis for behavioral support programs for disabled 
children.
257
 The regulations also define “aversive techniques” as “deliberate activities designed 
to establish a negative association with a specific behavior.”258 The Pennsylvania regulations 
provide examples of prohibited aversive techniques, including corporal punishment; locked 
rooms or spaces; noxious substances; “deprivation of basic human rights, such as withholding 
meals [or] water”; “treatment of a demeaning nature”; and “electric shock.”259 
The regulations specify that, when a disabled child’s behavior impedes learning, the 
child’s IEP team is required to develop a “positive behavioral support plan,” which must include 
“methods that utilize positive reinforcement and other positive techniques to shape a student’s or 
eligible young child’s behavior, ranging from the use of positive verbal statements as a reward 
for good behavior to specific tangible rewards.”260 Notwithstanding this emphasis on positive 
reinforcement, Pennsylvania does allow the use of restraint, as that term is defined, to be 
included in a child’s IEP as an approved behavioral intervention under certain circumstances.261 
                                                                                                                                                             
restraint in school, but those provisions do not discuss “aversive” interventions, procedures or techniques. 
For a comprehensive survey of state regulations regarding the use of seclusion and restraint, see Daniel 
Stewart, How Do the States Regulate Restraint and Seclusion in Public School? A Survey of the Strength 
and Weaknesses in State Laws, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 531 (2011). 
257
 22 Pa. Code §14.133 (2008). 
258
 Id. §§ 14.133(b), 711.46(b).  
259
 Id. §§ 14.133(e), 711.46(e). 
260
 Id. §§ 14.133(b), 711.46(b). 
261
 Id. §§ 14.133(c)(2), 711.46(c)(2). 
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Wyoming defines “aversives” as interventions that are “intended to induce pain or 
discomfort to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive behaviors.”262 The 
Wyoming regulations do not provide any examples of aversive interventions, which are 
“prohibited practices” that may not be utilized under any circumstances.263 Behavioral 
interventions may include “positive strategies, program or curricular modifications, and aids and 
supports required to address the disruptive behaviors.”264 Wyoming does, however, permit the 
use of certain forms of restraint and seclusion as part of a “planned behavioral intervention” 




Ohio also defines aversive interventions as interventions that “induce pain or discomfort 
to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive behaviors.”266 The Ohio 
regulations further provide that such interventions include “noxious, painful and/or intrusive 
stimuli, including any form of noxious, painful or intrusive spray, inhalant or taste.”267 Ohio 
defines “[p]ositive behavior intervention and supports” as both “systemic and individualized 
positive strategies to reinforce desired behaviors, diminish reoccurrences of challenging 
                                                                                                                                                             
262
 5-42 Wyo. Code R. § 6(j)(i) (2013). 
263
 Id. § 6(j). 
264
 Id. § 6(d). 
265
 Id. § 7(b). The Wyoming regulations prohibit the use of mechanical restraint or prone restraint 
under any circumstances. Id. § 6(j). The regulations also distinguish between different forms of seclusion 
and prohibit under any circumstances the use of “locked seclusion.” Id. § 6(n). 
266
 Ohio Admin. Code 3301-35-15(A)(1) (2013).  
267
 Id. 
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behaviors, and teach appropriate behaviors to students.”268 
Kentucky and Maine both prohibit the use of “[a]versive behavioral interventions” on any 
child “at any time.”269 These two states define an aversive behavioral intervention similarly. For 
example, Kentucky defines the intervention as one that “the implementer knows would cause 
physical trauma, emotional trauma, or both, to a student even when the substance or stimulus 
appears to be pleasant or neutral to others.”270 The Kentucky regulations provide specific 
examples of aversive interventions, including “hitting, pinching, slapping, water spray, noxious 
fumes, extreme physical exercise, loud auditory stimuli, withholding of meals, or denial of 
reasonable access to toileting facilities.”271 
The District of Columbia defines aversive interventions as “specific strategies for 
behavioral-treatment intervention” that include noxious, painful, intrusive stimuli, sprays, or 
inhalants; electric shock; pinches and deep muscle squeezes; withholding adequate sleep, shelter, 
clothing, bedding, or bathroom facilities; withholding food or water or intentionally altering 
staple food or drink to make it distasteful; or the use of chemical restraint.
272
 However, the 
District of Columbia’s prohibition on the use of aversive intervention applies only to children 
                                                                                                                                                             
268
 Id. at 3301-35-15(A)(7). 
269
 704 Ky. Admin Regs.7:160(3)(2)(c) (2013); 05-071 Code Me. R. §§ 2(1), 6(2)(F) (2001) (defining 
“aversive procedure” and prohibiting its use “under any circumstances” respectively). 
270
 704 Ky. Admin Regs. 7:160(1); 05-071 Code Me. R. § 2(1) (providing a similar definition of an 
“aversive procedure”). 
271
 704 Ky. Admin. Regs. 7:160(1). 
272
 D.C. CODE § 38-2561.01(1) (West, WestlawNext current through Feb. 21, 2014). 
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who are enrolled in nonpublic schools at public expense.
273
  
Montana defines “aversive treatment procedures” as physical restraint and isolation time-
out, two terms which are defined in the regulations.
274
 Those two aversive treatment procedures 
may be included as planned interventions in a child’s IEP only after a documented failure of 
positive behavioral interventions to effectively address the behavior.
275
 Montana prohibits other 
practices, such as procedures “intended to cause physical pain”; the use of “aversive mists, 
noxious odors, [or] unpleasant tastes”; and mechanical restraint, among others, but does not label 
those procedures as either “aversive” or “interventions.”276 
Nevada, California, Washington, and New Hampshire define aversive behavioral 
interventions
277
 to include, with some variations in language, the following: (a) noxious odors or 
tastes (or taste treatment programs); (b) noxious, toxic or unpleasant mists, sprays, or substances; 
(c) unreasonable force, restraint, or corporal punishment; (d) electric shock; or (e) isolation or 
removal to a locked room.
278
 A subset of these states also prohibit the following: (a) verbal and 
mental abuse, humiliation, or ridicule; (b) forced exercise; (c) blasts of air or painful noises or 
sounds; (d) withholding food, liquid, adequate sleep, shelter, clothing, bedding, or access to 
                                                                                                                                                             
273
 D.C. CODE § 38-2561.03. 
274
 Mont. Admin. R. 10.16.3346(2) (2013). 
275
 Id. 10.16.3346(7). 
276
 Id. 10.16.3346(4). 
277
 While substantively prohibiting certain behavioral interventions, California’s code does not use the 
term “aversive behavior interventions.” See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2 (2013).  
278
 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2(A); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5215, 394.354, 449.766 (2013); 
N.H. Code R. Ed. 1113.04(c), 1114.07(G) (2013); Wash. Admin. Code § 392-172A-03125 (2013).  
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bathroom facilities; (e) chemical restraint; (f) deprivation of one or more of the child’s senses; 
(g) water treatment; or (h) deprivation of medication.
279
 
California and Nevada prohibit the use of these aversive behavioral interventions, 
although restraint may be used in emergency circumstances.
280
 In Nevada, the use of restraint on 
a child may require the child’s IEP team to consider whether to conduct an FBA and implement 
a “positive behavior plan” and “positive behavioral supports.”281 Those two terms are not 
defined, but the Nevada Administrative Code does define “[p]ositive behavioral supports” as “a 
process for integrating behavior analysis . . . which focus[es] on promoting positive changes in 
behavior and enhancing the overall quality of life for pupils . . . without the use of negative or 
aversive means.”282 
Washington and New Hampshire allow certain forms of physical contact or restraint to be 
approved aversive interventions that are written into a child’s IEP (presumably as part of a BIP) 
but only after certain conditions have been met.
283
 These conditions include documenting the 
failure of positive behavioral interventions and specifying the type of aversive interventions to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
279
 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5215, 394.534, 449.766; N.H. 
Code R. Ed. 1113.04(c), 1114.07(g); Wash. Admin. Code §392-172A-03125. 
280
 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.1; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.5275. 
281
 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5275, 388.528. 
282
 Nev. Admin. Code § 388.077 (2013). 
283
 Washington allows the use of “bodily contact,” “isolation,” and “physical restraint” as part of a 
child’s BIP. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 392-172A-03130, 392-172A-03135. New Hampshire allows “non-
medical mechanical restraint” and “[p]hysical restraint” to be included in a child’s IEP. N.H. Code R. Ed. 
§§ 1113.06, 1114.09. 
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used; the reasons why aversive interventions are determined to be appropriate; the 
“circumstances under which the aversive interventions may be used”; the training and 
qualifications of the individual who will administer the aversive interventions; a means to 
evaluate the “effects of the use of the aversive interventions”; a time limit for the use of the 
intervention[s]; a system to record the “frequency, duration, and results of the intervention[s]”; 
and giving notice to the child’s parents.284 These states also require that positive behavioral 
interventions be implemented before any aversive interventions.
285
 
A.  The New York Regulations 
1. The Impetus for the Regulations 
Through 2005, New York had no regulations that addressed the use of aversive 
interventions in an educational setting. In July 2006, the New York State Education Department 
(NYSED) issued a notice indicating that NYSED had adopted “emergency” regulations that 
banned the use of aversive interventions.
286
 The same notice also provided notice to the public 
that NYSED was seeking comments on proposed non-emergency rule-making that would ban the 
inclusion of aversive interventions in a child’s IEP.287 Following a notice and comment period, in 
November 2006, NYSED issued revised regulations that became final.
288
 
                                                                                                                                                             
284
 N.H. Code R. Ed §§ 1113.06, 1114.09; Wash Admin. Code § 392-172A-03135. 
285
 N.H. Code R. Ed. §§ 1113.06, 1114.09; Wash Admin Code § 392-172A-03120. 
286
 See Notice of Proposed Emergency Adoption and Proposed Rule-Making, XXVIII N.Y. Reg. 10, 
11 (July 12, 2006) (noting that the proposed rule was meant to develop certain behavior intervention 
standards). 
287
 Id. at 11. 
288
 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 19.5(b). 
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NYSED was prompted to consider regulations that would ban the use of aversive 
interventions after, among other things, an April and May 2006 site visit to the Judge Rotenberg 
Center in Canton, Massachusetts (the “JRC”).289 The JRC is a residential facility for children and 
adults with severe behavioral issues.
290
 It has a very controversial past and has been the subject 
of intense criticism for its practices.
291
 The JRC is known for using aversive interventions 
                                                                                                                                                             
289
See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit at 1–2, Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 2013 WL 1329632 (Mar. 29, 2013). 
290
 Id. at 4. 
291
 For decades, the JRC has been intensely criticized for its methods. See e.g., Sharon Freagon, One 
Educator’s Perspective on the Use of Punishment or Aversives: Advocating for Supportive and Protective 
Systems, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 146, 136–150. In 1985, the JRC, then known as 
the Behavior Research Institute (BRI) was located in Providence, Rhode Island, although students from 
other states, including Massachusetts, were enrolled at the facility. In 1985, a student who was a 
Massachusetts resident died of asphyxiation at the BRI facility, apparently while being restrained. Id. at 
149. As a result of that incident, the State of Massachusetts sued the BRI in order to have certain practices 
or methods discontinued. In 1986, the BRI and the State of Massachusetts reached a settlement that 
required the facility to obtain court approval before using aversive interventions with any student. See 
Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t. of Mental Retardation, 677 NE.2d 127, 132 n.5 
(Mass. 1997) (reciting history leading to settlement).  
Over the years, there have been several reports of abuse at the JRC, including video taken in 2002 of 
one student being restrained and shocked and another incident in 2007 when students received dozens of 
shock treatments by staff. See Judge Rotenberg Center Trial: Tape Shows Teen Being Shocked 31 Times, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/judge-rotenberg-center-
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trial_n_1420633.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) (noting that the JRC’s attorney stated that the treatment 
plan was followed); Bianca Vázquez Toness, Founder Forced To Leave Controversial Special Needs 
School, 90.9 WBUR NPR BOSTON, http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/26/rotenberg (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) 
(referencing the 2007 incident in the discussion of the resignation of Matthew Israel, the founder of the 
JRC). In 2011, as part of a deal with prosecutors to avoid prosecution stemming from the 2007 incident, 
the Executive Director of the JRC, Matthew Israel, resigned from his position. School Head Quits After 
Shock Snafu, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE http://www.berkshireeagle.com/northeastnews/ci_18141525  
(updated May 26, 2011, 11:24 PM) (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). Even after this resignation, reports 
continue to surface about abusive practices at the JRC. See, e.g., Chris Burrell, Report Criticizes Canton 
School that uses Shock Therapy, PATRIOT LEDGER, http://www.patriotledger.com/x1506808054/Report-
criticizes-Canton-school-that-uses-shock-therapy (updated May 7, 2013, 7:12 AM) (last visited Aug. 31, 
2014).  
In 2010, a disability rights organization submitted a report to the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Torture urging that the Special Rapporteur initiate an inquiry to address whether practices at the JRC 
violated the United Nations Convention against Torture. See Laurie Ahern & Eric Rosenthal, Torture not 
Treatment: Electric Shock and Long-Term Restraint in the United States on Children and Adults with 
Disabilities at the Judge Rotenberg Center (2010) (available at www.mdri.org). In response, Special 
Rapporteur Manfred Nowak stated that he had sent an appeal to the United States government to 
investigate the school. See Katie Hinman & Kimberly Brown, UN Calls Shock Treatment At Mass. School 
“Torture” ABCNEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/shock-therapy-massachussetts-
school/story?id=11047334 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). U.N. Special Rapporteur Juan Mendez also stated 
that the use of shock treatment can constitute “torture.” See Mike Beaudet & Kevin Rothstein, U.N. 
Investigating Judge Rotenberg Center’s use of Shocks, FOX BOSTON, 
http://www.myfoxboston.com/story/18840703/2012/06/20/un-investigating-judge-rotenberg-centers-use-
of-shocks (“‘The passage of electricity through anybody’s body is clearly associated with pain and 
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including, particularly, contingent electric shock.
292
  
Although the JRC is located in Massachusetts, in 2006 there were just over 150 New 
York students
293
 who were enrolled at the JRC. Some of those students had been placed there by 
New York school districts under the provisions of IDEA.
294
 Because some students were placed 
                                                                                                                                                             
suffering. Now it depends on the level and time and whether there’s any rationale for it.’”) (updated July 
4, 2012, 8:16 PM) (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). 
In February 2013, the Autistic Self Advocacy Network sent a letter to the Food and Drug 
Administration urging that the government revoke the “cleared” status for the device through which 
electric shock is delivered to students. See Letter to the Food and Drug Administration on the Judge 
Rotenberg Center, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK, (Feb. 12, 2013) 
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2013/02/letter-to-food-and-drug-administration-on-the-judge-rotenberg-center 
(arguing for the elimination of “contingent electric shock and other aversive interventions”).ASAN also 
urged the government to deny the JRC any clearance to use any further devices that would allow the 
facility to deliver shock treatment to students. Id. 
292
 The JRC has FDA clearance to use a device known as a “Graduated Electronic Decelerator 
device” to deliver electronic shock. Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, No. 8:10-cv-036, 2010 WL 
3418424 at *1 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug, 10, 2010). 
293
 See Memorandum from Rebecca H. Cort to the Members of the Board of Regents, EMSC-VESID 
Committee, Policy on the Use of Aversive or Noxious Stimuli in Public and Private Schools Serving 
Student with Disabilities, (March 20, 2006) available at  http://www.regents.nysed.gov/meetings/ 
2006Meetings/March2006/0306emscvesidd6.htm. [hereinafter Cort memorandum] (discussing the 
numbers of New York State students approved for electric shock treatment).  
294
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10(B) (2006) (provisions governing children who are “placed in, or 
referred to, private schools by public agencies”). 
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In September 2005, NYSED officials visited the JRC to conduct a regular review, and in 
January 2006, the JRC received confirmation from NYSED that the facility was in compliance 
with New York regulations.
296
 Just two months later, however, both the JRC and the State of 
New York were sued by a former JRC student who alleged that the use of contingent electric 
shock by the staff at JRC violated the student’s civil rights.297 The student alleged that NYSED 
had “negligently failed to investigate” the practices of the JRC and had negligently failed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
295
 Bryant, 2010 WL 3418424 at *2. 
296
 See Letter from Jerri Forshaw, Reg’l Assoc., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, to Matthew Israel, Exec. 
Dir., Judge Rotenberg Center, (Jan. 11, 2006) available at 
http://www.judgerotenbergeducationalcenter.net/NYSEDNov05report.pdf. (providing documentation and 
notification of compliance); Letter from Jerri Forshaw, Reg’l Assoc., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, to Matthew 
Israel, Exec. Dir., Judge Rotenberg Ctr. (Nov. 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.judgerotenbergeducationalcenter.net/NYSEDNov05report.pdf. (providing notification of the 
final report of the September 2005 visit). 
297
 See Exhibit A, Nicholson Verified Pet., at 1, 6, to Aff. of Rebecca Cort Filed in Opposition to Pl. 
Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., Alleyne v. NY St. Educ. Dept., Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS 
(N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006) (arguing that the JRC’s failure to properly perform its duties under the 
law and its use of aversives threatened the student’s life); Exhibit B, Nicholson Claim, at 1–3, to Aff. of 
Rebecca Cort Filed in Opposition to Pl. Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., Alleyne v. NY St. Educ. Dept., 
Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS (N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006) (making a claim against New York 
State and the New York State Department of Education for monetary damages). 
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enforce certain New York laws regarding the use of corporal punishment.
298
  
The filing of the lawsuit and apparent “questions from legislators, the Board of Regents[,] 
and others”299 prompted NYSED to take action. On March 20, 2006, Rebecca Cort of NYSED 
forwarded a memorandum to the New York Board of Regents raising the issue whether the 
Regents “[s]hould  . . . adopt a new policy that prohibits or limits the use of certain behavioral 
approaches, including the use of certain aversive or noxious stimuli to reduce or eliminate 
maladaptive behaviors of students.”300  
In April, NYSED began an in-depth review of practices at the JRC.
301
 On June 12, 2006, 
the team conducting the review issued a report sharply criticizing the JRC.
302
 Among other 
findings, the report stated that staff at the JRC employed aversive behavioral interventions on 
students who had no “clear history of self-injurious behaviors” or who had not demonstrated 
                                                                                                                                                             
298
 See Nicholson v. State, 23 Misc.3d 313 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. (2008)) (granting defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment). 
299
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302
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aggressive or destructive behaviors warranting the application of an aversive intervention.
303
 The 
report also found that there was “limited evidence” either that students had received FBAs as 
might be required by the IDEA or that JRC staff had collected the data necessary to prepare 
FBAs.
304
 The report also criticized the JRC educational programming as a “punishment model” 
that was “organized around the elimination of problem behaviors largely through punishment, 
including the use of delayed punishment practices.”305 As a result, the report found, “[t]he 
privacy and dignity of students [wa]s compromised in the course of JRC’s program 
implementation.”306 
Several days after the publication of the report criticizing the JRC, NYSED published its 
Notice of Emergency Rule-Making in which it adopted the regulations on an emergency basis 
while simultaneously providing the public with an opportunity for notice and comment.
307
 After 




2. The Content of the Regulations 
The regulations generally define an aversive intervention as one “that is intended to 
induce pain or discomfort to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive 
                                                                                                                                                             
303








 XXVIII N.Y. Reg. 10, at 11 (July 12, 2006); June 22, 2006 Notice Of Emergency Rule-Making, 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/behavioral/requirements606.htm 
308
 XXVIII N.Y. Reg. 13 (November 15, 2006). 
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behaviors.”309 The regulations further identify specific forms of prohibited aversive 
interventions, including the application of “noxious, painful, intrusive stimuli or activities; 
strangling, shoving, deep muscle squeezes”; “any form of noxious, painful or intrusive spray, 
inhalant or tastes”; the denial or delay in providing a meal or “intentionally altering staple food 
or drink in order to make it distasteful”; “movement limitation used as a punishment, including 
but not limited to helmets and mechanical restraint devices”; and other similar actions.310  
The New York regulations also identify certain interventions or techniques that are not 
prohibited aversive interventions. The regulations allow the use of “such interventions as voice 
control, limited to loud, firm commands; time-limited ignoring of a specific behavior; token fines 
as part of a token economy system; brief physical prompts to interrupt or prevent a specific 
behavior; interventions medically necessary for the treatment or protection of the student; or 
other similar interventions.”311  
New York also provided a “[c]hild-specific exemption to [the] use [of] aversive 
interventions” that included both a grandfather clause and a sunset date.312 The grandfather 
clause allowed a child’s IEP to include the use of aversive interventions for any school year 
subsequent to the 2008-2009 school year only if the child’s “IEP include[d] the use of aversive 
interventions as of June 30, 2009.”313  The regulations also permitted the continued use of 
aversive interventions, as provided in a child’s IEP, for three academic school years following 
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 N.Y. Comp Code R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 19.5(b). 
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 Id. § 200.22(e). 
313
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promulgation of the regulations, up to and including the 2008–2009 school year.314 After the 
2008-2009 school year, the regulations sought to ban the use of aversive interventions entirely.
315
 
The regulations allowed the use of aversive interventions pursuant to the child-specific 
exemption only when a child “display[ed] self-injurious and/or aggressive behaviors that 
threaten[ed] the . . . well being of” either the child or others.316 If the child displayed such 
behavior, a panel of experts was required to be convened to approve the use of aversive 
interventions for that particular child.
317
  
NYSED submitted the regulations to the United States Department of Education in 2007 
and, in June 2007, received a letter that the regulations were substantially consistent with 




 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 289, at *7 (pdf pages 3-4, 7) 
(recognizing that there was a statewide policy prohibiting the use of aversive interventions). 
316
 N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.22(e)(1). 
317
 Id. § 200.22(e)(6)(i)–(ii). These provisions of the regulations acknowledge that aversive 
interventions are supported by scientific research and can be effective to reduce severe behavior. First, the 
regulations provide that any approved aversive interventions must be “implemented consistent with peer-
reviewed research.” Id. § 200.22(f)(2)(v). Second, the regulations require the panel of experts to 
determine either that a “full range of evidence-based positive behavioral interventions have been 
consistently employed over an appropriate period of time and have failed to result in sufficient 
improvement of a student’s behavior,” or that the child’s behavior “pose[s] significant health and safety 
concerns that warrant the use of aversive interventions to effect rapid suppression of the behavior and a 
range of nonaversive prevention strategies have been employed and have failed to provide a sufficient 
level of safety.” Id. § 200.22(e)(6)(i)–(ii) 




V. LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE NEW YORK REGULATIONS 
A.  The Alleyne Litigation 
In August 2006, while the emergency regulations were in place, several parents of 
students enrolled at the JRC sued NYSED, seeking a temporary restraining order enjoining 
NYSED from enforcing the regulations.
319
 In Alleyne v. New York State Education Department, 
all of the children had IEPs that authorized the use of aversive interventions, including the use of 
contingent electric shock, to address severe behavior.
320
  
In September 2006, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction and enjoined enforcement of the regulations against those students.
321
 In October 
2006, the district court issued another injunction based on the plaintiffs’ concerns that the 
children’s IEPs were not being “revised for the [following] school year” or “were being revised 
without parental consent” with the intention of excluding the use of aversive interventions in the 
children’s IEPs.322 In a February 2007 hearing, the federal district court issued a further 
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 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 289, at *21 (pdf pages 4 and 
21) (arguing that the “court’s ruling . . . is . . . consistent with the position of the federal agency 
responsible for education policy”). 
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injunction enjoining NYSED from enforcing certain revisions that the Department had made in 
January 2007 to the state regulations.
323
 The court expressed concern that the January 2007 
revisions, which required that any aversive interventions be implemented by a “licensed or 
certified professional,” would in practice discontinue the use of aversive interventions, thereby 
circumventing the court’s prior injunction.324  
NYSED appealed the court’s February 2007 order.325 The Second Circuit reversed and 
remanded on the ground that the district court had not considered “irreparable harm and 
likelihood of success on the merits.”326 The defendants then filed motions for summary 




The court first considered the plaintiffs’ “global” claim that the regulations conflicted 
with provisions of IDEA. On that global claim, the court held that the NYSED regulations 
represented “a permissible educational policy choice” and that the “prevailing disfavor for 
aversive techniques weighs strongly in favor of the validity of the regulations.”328 The court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ “facial attack” on the 
regulations as being contrary to the dictates of IDEA.
329
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 Id. at 100. 
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 Id. at 99–100.. 
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 Alleyne v. N.Y. State Educ. Dept’t., 691 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327–328 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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In so holding, the court first noted that IDEA “‘does not usurp [a] state’s traditional role 
in setting educational policy.’”330 The court found that the regulations, which were designed to 
ultimately eliminate all use of aversive interventions in New York, were “consistent with the 
IDEA’s focus on positive behavioral modification methods.”331 The court reached this result as a 
matter of law even as the court noted that the expert opinions proffered by the plaintiffs were 
considerably “more comprehensive than any expert opinion proffered by the defendants.”332 
Indeed, the court acknowledged that one of the defendants’ own experts, Dr. Hagopian, had 
“conceded that ‘the position that punishment should not be used is more of a philosophical based 
type of position,’ and that it is inappropriate to completely ban aversives.”333 Thus, even with the 
sworn deposition testimony from one of the defendants’ expert witnesses that the science of 
ABA did not warrant a complete ban on aversive interventions, the court nonetheless held that 
IDEA’s language endorsing the use of positive behavioral interventions demonstrated that the 
defendants were entitled, as a matter of educational policy, to ban aversive interventions.
334
 
However, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 
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333
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plaintiffs’ claim that the regulations, as applied to each of them individually, denied them a 
FAPE.
335
 The court held that, on the current record, it could not determine as a matter of law that 
the plaintiffs had received a FAPE.
336
 The court also declined “to dissolve the preliminary 
injunction.”337  
The Alleyne litigation is ongoing.
338
 The preliminary injunctions remain in place and, as a 
result, the IEPs of those children still can include the use of aversive interventions.
339
  
B.  The Bryant Litigation 
1. Factual Background 
On January 10, 2010, the guardians of seven students residing at the JRC filed suit in 
federal district court against NYSED, the Commissioner of Education, and the New York Board 
of Regents seeking to enjoin NYSED from enforcing the New York regulations banning the use 
of aversive interventions.
340
 The seven guardians who filed suit were all family members of the 
JRC students; six were the parents of a student and one was the aunt of a student.
341
 The 
guardians all alleged that the students were in need of aversive interventions to control, reduce, 
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or eliminate problematic behaviors but that none of the students would be able to receive 
aversive interventions if the NYSED regulations were enforced.
342
 
The students in the Bryant litigation had been diagnosed with a variety of disorders, 
including autism,
343
 Impulsive Control Disorder (NOS),
344





 Oppositional Defiant Disorder,
347
 Mood Disorder (NOS),
348
 and other 
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behavior disorders that cause the students to engage in dangerous and disruptive behaviors.
349
 
Those behaviors included repeated head-banging against hard objects;
350
 using a fingernail to 
slice open one’s tongue;351 disrobing in public;352 pulling out one’s own teeth by force;353 
destroying physical property (beds, televisions, computers, windows, walls);
354
 physically 
attacking family members (including younger siblings);
355
 setting fire to a bedroom at home;
356
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 Bryant Declaration, supra note 345, at ¶2, George Declaration, supra note 343, at ¶2, Houston-
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and assaulting teachers and staff; resulting in broken bones, among other examples.
357
 These 
behaviors resulted in multiple 911 calls, expulsion from public school, emergency placement in 
psychiatric hospitals, and other confinements in psychiatric institutions.
358
 





 speech and occupational therapy,
361
 and 





The students had received years of special education services in a variety of educational 
settings, both public and private.
364
 Due to their behaviors, the students had not been able to 
remain in restricted, self-contained classrooms in a public school setting; several students were 
placed in psychiatric institutions before they were admitted to JRC.
365
 Other students were either 
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refused admission or expelled from private residential facilities due to their behavior.
366
 
One student’s history of placements was particularly telling. The student had been placed 
in a private residential facility whose therapeutic approach, according to its website, 
encompassed “a positive approaches philosophy utilizing behavioral interventions at the micro 
and macro levels.”367 The facility sought to expel the student because of the severity of his 
behavior.
368
 When the parents asked that the student remain, apparently because no other 
placement was available, the facility required the parents to sign a document not just releasing all 
claims against the facility arising from injury to the student, but also agreeing to indemnify the 
facility with regard to any claims made against the facility by any person who might be injured 
by the child.
369
 The document stated that “despite every clinical intervention employed to date, 
including but not limited to, 24-hour, 1-to-1 supervision, the facility could not keep the child 
from engaging in serious self-injurious behavior.
370
 The child was transferred to the JRC.
371
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For three of the seven students, the students’ home school district recommended 
placement at the JRC as necessary to provide the student with a FAPE.
372
 The guardians of three 
other students had placed those individuals at JRC without consent of the school district, but the 
guardians were able to establish in due process proceedings that placement at the JRC was 
necessary to provide the students with a FAPE.
373
 The guardian of one student also had placed 
the student at JRC without prior approval of the student’s public school district and no FAPE 
determination had yet been made in any due process proceeding.
374
  
2. The District Court’s Decision in Bryant 
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction; the defendants both opposed the motion for preliminary injunction and filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint.
375
 On August 26, 2010, the federal district court issued an opinion 
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The court first defined an “aversive” intervention in a manner that went far beyond the 
specific interventions identified in the New York regulations themselves. Rather, the court 
defined an aversive intervention as follows: 
Aversive behavior modification techniques rely on consequences that are 
carefully designed to decrease a problematic behavior. Aversive interventions are 
used on an individualized, specifically–defined basis to treat a student’s 
problematic behaviors, including aggressive, dangerous, self–injurious, 
destructive, disruptive, and noncompliant behavior. The goal is effective 
deceleration or minimization of problematic behaviors, which in turn enables a 
student to receive an appropriate education, promotes the student’s safety, and 





Then, with no detailed discussion, “the court deem[ed] controlling the conclusions reached in 
Alleyne”—specifically the conclusion made in Alleyne that the New York regulations banning 
the use of aversive interventions did not contravene the provisions of IDEA.
378
   
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the regulations deprived the children’s 
guardians of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the drafting of each child’s IEP.379 In 
support of this argument, the plaintiffs primarily relied on two cases, Deal v. Hamilton County 
Board of Education,
380
 and Kalliope R. v. New York State Department of Education.
381
 In Deal, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a school district violated the procedural requirements 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2010)). 
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of IDEA when it “predetermined” before an IEP team meeting that the school district would not 
provide ABA therapy to a child diagnosed with autism.
382
 In Kalliope, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York denied NYSED’s motion to dismiss a complaint, in 
which the plaintiffs had alleged that NYSED had predetermined the contents of children’s IEPs 
by issuing regulations that dictated a particular student-teacher class size ratio.
383
 The court in 
Kalliope ruled that the plaintiffs had stated a viable claim that the NYSED regulations might 
prohibit the children’s IEP teams from engaging in “an individualized assessment of a given 




The federal district court in Bryant rejected this argument.
386
 The court distinguished 
Deal and Kalliope on the grounds that they involved questions of permissible teaching methods 
and student-teacher ratios respectively, issues that the court deemed, without further explanation, 
to be “quite distinct”387 from the use of aversive interventions.388  
3. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Bryant 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling granting the 
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defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.389 The court identified two claims raised by the 
plaintiffs: a procedural claim that the regulations violated the procedural requirements of IDEA 
in terms of parental participation in the IEP process and a substantive claim that the regulations 
would deprive the children of a FAPE.
390
  
The court first rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural claim that the regulations deprived the 
children’s parents of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process by 
predetermining that certain behavioral interventions could not be implemented.
391
 In so holding, 
the court essentially reduced the entire category of aversive interventions to a single process or 
method. In particular, the court stated: “[N]othing in New York’s regulation prevents 
individualized assessment or precludes educators from considering a wide range of possible 
treatments. The regulation prohibits consideration of a single method of treatment without 
foreclosing other options.”392 Concluding that the regulations affected just “one possible 
method”393 of behavioral intervention, the court found that no predetermination in violation of 
IDEA had taken place.
394
 
The court did acknowledge, citing Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i), that IDEA “does not prohibit 
alternatives such as aversives.”395 The court, however, ignored the plain text of Section 
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1414(d)(3)(B)(i), which requires the IEP team to consider both positive behavioral interventions 
“and other strategies” to address problem behavior.396 Rather, the court held, without detailed 
discussion, that a state regulation “that relies on positive behavioral interventions only is [not] 
incompatible with the IDEA.”397  
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ substantive claim that the regulations violated 
IDEA’s requirement that each child receive a FAPE.398 The court again rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim, principally for two reasons. The court found that plaintiffs’ insistence that the children 
required the use of aversive interventions amounted to a claim for an educational program that 
would “maximize the children’s potential.”399 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, 




The court also held that NYSED’s decision to ban the use of aversive interventions was a 
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matter of “education policy,”401 which the court was required to give deference under Rowley.402 
Noting that “[t]here is an ongoing debate among the experts regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of aversive interventions and positive-only methods of behavioral 
modification,”403 the court characterized itself as “not institutionally suited to now second guess 
the policy decision made by experts charged with formulating education policy in New York.”404 
Rather, the court held that NYSED could opt for “positive-only methods of behavioral 
modification.”405  
Judge Richard Sullivan, a federal district judge sitting by designation on the Second 
Circuit, dissented from the majority opinion.
406
 Judge Sullivan criticized the majority’s finding 
that the regulations reflect “‘a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the 
education and safety of its children’”407 on the ground that the majority had not credited the 
substantial debate in the psychological community about the efficacy of aversive interventions to 
treat severe behavior.
408
 Noting that the case had been decided on a motion to dismiss the 
complaint and that the plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint that substantial scientific research 
supported the use of aversive interventions to treat severe behavior, Judge Sullivan expressed 
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concern that the majority had not undertaken the “searching” review that is required to ensure 
compliance with IDEA.
409
 Judge Sullivan contended that the case should have been remanded to 
the district court for the development of a fuller record, including a more detailed review of the 
scientific literature pertaining to the use of aversive interventions.
410
  
Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.
411
 The Court 
declined to hear the case.
412
 
VI. THE COURT IN BRYANT MISINTERPRETED IDEA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN ROWLEY 
 
A.  The Second Circuit Ignored Well-Settled Rules of Statutory Construction 
IDEA explicitly directs a child’s IEP team to consider both “positive behavioral 
interventions and supports” and “other strategies” to address behavior that impedes the child’s 
learning.
413
 “Clearly, IDEA does not prohibit the use of aversives.”414 
When the Second Circuit held that NYSED could promulgate regulations that banned
415
 
certain forms of aversive interventions, the court stated: “[I]t cannot be said that a policy that 
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relies on positive behavioral interventions only is incompatible with the IDEA.”416 In so holding, 
the Second Circuit essentially wrote the phrase “and other strategies” out of the statute. 
Well-established rules of statutory construction dictate that whenever the courts interpret 
statutory language the courts should choose the interpretation that gives effect to all of the words 
of the statute. “A statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some 
operative effect.”417 A statute should be interpreted “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”418  
The Supreme Court has held that the use of the word “other” in statutory language 
indicates Congress’s intent to add to a list of statutorily identified items. In United States v. 
Powell, the Supreme Court held that a criminal statute that prohibited the mailing of “pistols, 
revolvers and other firearms capable of being concealed on the person” included within the 
prohibited items any firearm, in addition to a pistol or revolver, so long as the firearm was 
capable of being concealed on a person.
419
 The Court specifically rejected the argument that the 
term “other firearms” was limited to include only the more specific items, pistols and revolvers, 
already identified in the statute.
420
 Similarly, the Court in Duncan v. Walker noted in dicta that a 
statute containing the words “post-conviction or other collateral review” required that the phrase 
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“other collateral review” include a form of review over and above any review identified as “post-
conviction” review.421  
Similarly, the phrase “and other strategies” in IDEA must have a meaning distinct from 
the phrase “positive behavioral supports and interventions.” The use of the conjunction “and” 
clearly demonstrates that the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and supports” is not 
exhaustive. In holding that a policy of “positive-only interventions”422 comports with IDEA, the 
Bryant Court simply ignored the clear words of the statute. 
Even beyond the plain meaning of the statute, nothing in the legislative history of IDEA 
indicates Congress’s intent to ban the use of aversive interventions.423 Indeed, the U.S. 
Department of Education interprets IDEA to allow the use of aversive interventions. In a letter 
dated January 26, 2010, Education Secretary Arne Duncan stated that “[t]he IDEA emphasizes 
and encourages the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, but does not prohibit 
the use of other measures, such as seclusion, non-emergency restraint, or aversive behavioral 
interventions, when appropriate to address student behavior.”424  
B.  The Second Circuit Misapplied the Supreme Court’s Holding in Rowley 
The Second Circuit also determined that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, 
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it was required to defer to educators’ choice of one side of this debate about the use of aversive 
interventions.
425
 This determination was incorrect. 
In Rowley, the Court discussed at some length the statutory procedural safeguards and, 
specifically, the rights and protections afforded to parents and guardians.
426
 The Court reasoned 
that Congress had a specific intent when it included “elaborate and highly specific procedural 
safeguards”427 in conjunction with other “general and somewhat imprecise substantive”428 
concepts such as the FAPE requirement. The Court determined that Congress had intended to 
“place[] every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and 
guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it 
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.”429  
The Court also clarified the appropriate role of the judiciary in reviewing educators’ 
judgments about educational policy and teaching methods, noting that the statute granted state 
and local education agencies the “primary responsibility . . . for choosing the educational method 
most suitable to the child’s needs.”430 The Court then stated that the judiciary lacks “‘specialized 
knowledge and experience’ necessary to resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational 
policy.’”431 The Court stated that the judiciary must determine only whether the requirements of 
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In articulating its view of the appropriate balance between judicial review and deference 
to educators, however, the Court expressly considered that the disputed methodology choice 
would have been the subject of an administrative due process proceeding under the statute. In 
particular, the Court stated:  
The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility [of] . . .  ‘adopting, where 
appropriate, promising educational practices and materials.’ §1413(a)(3). In the 
face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress 
intended courts to overturn a State’s choice of appropriate educational theories in 




Indeed, the Court reiterated that any deference is dependent upon a process that ensures 
parental involvement on an individual basis, including the rights of parents to initiate due process 
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proceedings in order to contest the proposed educational plan for the child. The Court stated that 
“[e]ntrusting a child’s education to state and local agencies does not leave the child without 
protection”434 because the Act’s provisions “protect individual children by providing for parental 
involvement” both in the development of state plans and policy and “in the formulation of the 
child’s individual educational program.”435 Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized the 
substantial procedural rights given to parents, which allows parents both to participate in the 
drafting of a child’s educational plan and to challenge the adequacy of any such plan.436  
The Court thus clearly contemplated that the judiciary would accord the appropriate level 
of deference to methodology choices made by educators only after (a) an educational method had 
been selected for a single child whose parents were included in the process of formulating an 
IEP; and (b) the choice of educational method could have been subject to further review in an 
administrative proceeding. Nothing in the Rowley opinion suggests that the judiciary was 
required to defer to methodology choices made via a state agency rule-making process, a process 
that contains none of the procedural safeguards of the kind set forth in the Act.
437
 
In the thirty years since Rowley was decided, the lower federal courts have applied this 
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deferential review in cases involving disputes between educators and the parents of particular 
children.
438
 The Second Circuit, for example, has cited Rowley repeatedly for the proposition that 
administrative hearing officers have primary responsibility for determining whether a proposed 
IEP provides a child with a FAPE.
439
 While the rulings at the administrative level are subject to 
an “‘independent’ judicial review,”440 the federal courts are expected to give due weight to the 
administrative proceedings. Such deference is “particularly appropriate when the state [hearing] 
officer's review ‘has been thorough and careful.’”441 
Other federal courts emphasize that deference is the result of educators’ responsibility to 
“choos[e] the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs.”442 While the courts do 
caution that the judiciary “‘must be careful to avoid imposing [the court's] view of preferable 
education methods upon the State,’”443 this level of deference presumes that school officials will 
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“tailor an educational program to the needs of the child.”444 
However, before the Bryant decision, no court had extended the concept of deference to 
the circumstances where a state educational agency made methodology choices through 
administrative rulemaking rather than an individual decision made when drafting an IEP for a 
particular child. The reason is clear: the process by which a member of the public can influence 
or object to proposed agency rule-making involves participation rights that are substantially 
different and more curtailed than the rights of a parent to challenge the adequacy of a child’s 
proposed IEP in an administrative proceeding.
445
 The right, for example, to “comment on”446 
proposed agency rules is wholly unlike a parent’s right to have an impartial hearing before a 
single judicial officer in which the parent can be represented by an attorney, present the 
testimony of an expert witness, compel the attendance of other witnesses, cross-examine 
witnesses, present other evidence, obtain a transcript of the full hearing at no expense, receive a 
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written opinion, and have the right to appeal.
447
 
Indeed, when a parent seeks to challenge the authority of an SEA to promulgate 
regulations in the field of education, the parent is not required to exhaust the administrative 
remedies available under IDEA simply because the nature of the parent’s challenge is the 
agency’s implementation of a statewide “policy, not whether a particular IEP is appropriate for a 
particular student.”448 Similarly, the New York regulations at issue in the Bryant litigation 
constituted a “general prohibition” and a “statewide determination made as a matter of 
educational policy,”449 rather than a choice of educational method that was made with regard to 
any particular child. 
Thus, the Second Circuit simply misapplied Rowley, where the Court expressly 
considered that the rights of parents to participate in educational decision-making and to 
challenge unsatisfactory choices via the administrative due process procedures were important 
components. In the absence of those protections available to contest a methodology choice, no 
deference is warranted. 
C.  The Second Circuit Misunderstood the Science of ABA 
Finally, the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bryant reflects a misunderstanding of the 
science of applied behavior analysis and the use of behavioral interventions. In ruling that the 
New York regulations did not violate the provisions of IDEA, the Second Circuit characterized 
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New York’s policy as approving the use of “positive-only” behavioral interventions.450 The 
Court determined that a ban on non-positive behavioral interventions was acceptable, describing 
the ban as foreclosing just a “single method of treatment” that is available among many “other 
options.”451 By describing a positive-only intervention policy prohibiting just one treatment 
option, the Court misapplied or misunderstood at least two important ABA concepts. 
First, the Second Circuit apparently did not understand the concept of the least restrictive 
or least intrusive alternative.
452
 When seeking to change behavior of a specific child, the 
behavior analyst is to determine which form of intervention will be the least intrusive 
intervention that can effectively treat the behavior.
453
 Consequences-based interventions using 
reinforcement are considered less intrusive than consequences-based interventions that use 
punishment techniques and, for that reason, the behavior analyst adhering to professional 
standards will implement a punishment-based intervention only after less intrusive, 
reinforcement-based interventions have failed to produce good results.
454
 The Second Circuit’s 
characterization of non-positive interventions as one method among many appears to reflect a 
belief that the interventions are always equally applicable and interchangeable, when that is not 
the case.  
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The Second Circuit’s position that a state can ban the category of “non-positive”455 
interventions because it is just a single method of treatment among many treatment options 
seems particularly nonsensical when one considers the specific history of the children who were 
the subject of the Bryant litigation. Those children had significant histories of multiple 
interventions that had been implemented across many different settings for years, yet their severe 
problem behavior persisted.
456
 In essence, the Second Circuit recommended that the children 
continue to receive the “positive-only”457 interventions that had been proven to be ineffective in 
the past. 
The Second Circuit’s decision also is troubling because it does not allow the behavior 
analyst to develop a BIP that includes components of both reinforcement-based and punishment-
based interventions. The scientific research repeatedly demonstrates that better outcomes are 
achieved when positive reinforcement and punishment interventions are paired together.
458
 If all 
non-positive interventions are prohibited, the behavior analyst cannot design a BIP that includes 
elements of both reinforcement and punishment interventions, even if the behavior analyst might 
determine that, under ABA principles, a multi-component approach would be most effective to 
treat problem behavior. 
In dissenting from the majority opinion in Bryant, Judge Sullivan recognized that the 
Court lacked sufficient information about the science. Judge Sullivan clearly articulated his 
concern that the Court had made a judgment on the science without a complete record or in-
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depth understanding of the science of behavioral interventions.
459
 His concern was well founded. 
The most troubling aspects of the Bryant decision are the Court’s apparent endorsement of a 
positive-only intervention policy as being both acceptable under scientific standards and in 
compliance with IDEA. In this manner, the Second Circuit truly placed at risk the fundamental 




VII. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE IDEA’S LANGUAGE REGARDING BEHAVIORAL 
INTERVENTIONS 
 
This debate about the appropriateness of certain behavioral interventions to address 
problem behavior of disabled children is ongoing. The recent attempts to pass federal legislation 
that would regulate the use of seclusion, restraint, and “aversive behavioral interventions” is a 
strong indicator that this topic will be a key issue when Congress next amends and reauthorizes 
IDEA.
461
 Indeed, advocacy groups for both educators and the disabled have highlighted this 
issue in position papers and statements regarding upcoming issues for IDEA reauthorization.
462
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Thus, this Section sets forth several steps Congress can take when it amends and reauthorizes 
IDEA. 
A.  An FBA and BIP Should Be Required Whenever Behavior Impedes Learning 
The current structure of IDEA requires that an FBA be conducted and a BIP be 
implemented only when the child’s behavior has been the subject of disciplinary proceedings 
under 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k).
463
 Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i), which requires the child’s IEP 
team to consider behavioral interventions whenever the child’s behavior impedes learning, is 
conspicuously devoid of any reference to an FBA or BIP.
464
 Congress should amend Section 
1414(d)(3)(B)(i) to require that an FBA be conducted and a BIP be implemented whenever a 
child’s IEP team determines that the child exhibits behavior that impedes learning, even if that 
behavior has not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings.  
This addition to Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) is necessary for several reasons. First, among 
behavior analysts, it is considered standard practice to conduct an FBA whenever a child exhibits 
problem behavior.
465
 By requiring an FBA and BIP in Section 1414(d)(3)(b)(i), Congress will 
ensure that each student’s programming conforms to professional practices. In addition, if IDEA 
requires that all behavioral interventions be written in a BIP, school staff cannot unilaterally 
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implement some inappropriate procedure in the classroom and later claim that the procedure was 
a form of behavioral intervention.
466
 Congress will protect children against such unauthorized 
and inappropriate conduct by amending IDEA to require that all behavioral interventions be 
contained in a written BIP. 
More importantly, however, early assessment in the form of an FBA and early 
intervention in the form of a BIP may help to reduce or eliminate problem behavior before it 
becomes a discipline issue. Currently IDEA’s disciplinary provisions only apply when the school 
seeks to suspend or expel the student or move the student to a different educational setting.
467
 It 
seems nonsensical that the statute would not require an FBA and BIP until a student’s behavior 
has escalated to a point where suspension or expulsion is a possibility. Rather, an FBA should be 
conducted and, if appropriate, a BIP implemented, whenever the child’s IEP team determines 
that the child exhibits behavior that impedes learning.
468
 By including the requirement for an 
FBA and BIP in the statutory provisions that address the various factors that a child’s IEP team 
must consider as part of the development of the child’s IEP, the statute will ensure that problem 
behavior is addressed at a much earlier stage.  
B.  The Phrase “Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports” Should Be Deleted from 
Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) 
 
The meaning and emphasis of PBS has changed dramatically since the term “positive 
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behavioral interventions and supports” first appeared in IDEA in 1997.469 As prominently noted 
on OSEP’s pbis.org website, PBS is not a process to devise an appropriate BIP for a particular 
child; it is a framework for designing school environments to reduce problem behavior across the 
entire student body.
470
 The reference to PBS, however, appears in the provision of IDEA that 
addresses the process by which a specific child’s IEP team develops an IEP for that particular 
child.
471
 It simply makes no sense that a child’s IEP team must contemplate the development of a 
school-wide framework, or the institution of school-wide disciplinary policies or procedures, 
during the process of developing an IEP for a specific child. For this reason, the phrases should 
be stricken from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). 
If Congress wishes to endorse the PBS framework as a means to improve the school 
environment for all children and reduce disciplinary issues on a school-wide basis, it certainly 
can express that position in some statutory provision other than Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). PBS 
strategies, such as instituting discipline policies, safe schools initiatives, social skills training, 
and anti-bullying and anti-harassment efforts, are all important strategies to improve the school 
environment and reduce behavior issues among all students in the community.
472
 Thus, the 
suggestion to delete the language from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) should not be construed as a 
suggestion to abandon the PBS framework. The endorsement of PBS simply belongs elsewhere. 
Currently, however, the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and supports” as 
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contained in Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) causes confusion. Some states have issued poorly worded 
statutes or regulations with the mistaken belief that IDEA prohibits any interventions that would 
be perceived as “negative” by the child.473 A prime example is Pennsylvania’s definition of 
“aversive techniques” as “[d]eliberate activities designed to establish a negative association with 
a specific behavior.”474 Under this definition, no child can lose a privilege as a result of engaging 
in problem behavior since the loss of privilege is designed to cause that “negative association”475 
to occur.  
While the Pennsylvania regulations do include examples of prohibited techniques with 
which no one would quibble (e.g., “[t]reatment of a demeaning nature”),476 it is quite a logical 
leap to say that no BIP should ever include an intervention that would cause the child to establish 
a negative association with a specific behavior. There are a myriad of effective punishment-
based interventions that are neither demeaning nor physically painful that would cause a child to 
establish a negative association with a specific behavior and thereby reduce the frequency of that 
behavior.
477
 IDEA should allow the use of appropriate behavioral interventions that would cause 
a child to make that negative association with the behavior, thereby hopefully reducing the 
frequency with which the behavior would occur in the future.  
Other state statutes and regulations suffer from similar defects in terms of language used 
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to describe “aversive interventions.” Nevada’s statutes require that students have a “positive 
behavior plan” and “positive behavioral supports.”478 Neither Nevada’s statutes nor its 
regulations define the term “positive behavior plan,” although the Nevada Administrative Code 
does define the term “positive behavioral supports” as a process to “promot[e] positive changes 
in behavior” without using “negative or aversive means.”479 These provisions, like 
Pennsylvania’s, also seem to reach too far in prohibiting the use of any intervention that the child 
would perceive to be negative.  
Banning interventions that cause “discomfort” to the child also may be too vague.480 The 
subjective nature of measuring “discomfort” is a poor standard by which to determine whether an 
intervention is appropriate. Take, for example, a child who engages in hand mouthing. One 
possible positive punishment intervention to reduce the behavior of hand mouthing may be to 
require the child to wash his or her hands under cold tap water for a specified length of time after 
every instance of hand mouthing. The cold water or prescribed length of time that the child is 
required to wash hands might cause some discomfort, yet such an intervention to treat that 
problem behavior, which causes no pain or physical harm, should be eminently acceptable. 
Effective behavioral interventions that might expose the child to “immediate temporary 
discomfort”481 that falls far short of any inhumane, painful, or degrading treatment should not be 
prohibited. 
With many of these state statutes and regulations, the difficulty lies in using subjective 
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 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.5275 (2013) 
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 Nev. Admin. Code 388.077 (2013) 
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 See, e.g., 5–42 Wyo. Code. R. §6(j)(i) (2013). 
481
 Van Houten, supra note 55, at 383. 
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terms like “positive” and “aversive” to describe behavioral interventions. To eliminate this 
problem, Congress should simply remove the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and 
supports” from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). 
C.  The United States Department of Education Should Promulgate Regulations That Define 
Prohibited Practices 
 
Although Congress should remove the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and 
supports” from Section 1414(d)(B)(3)(i), in amending IDEA, Congress also should authorize the 
Department of Education to promulgate regulations that will define certain prohibited practices. 
Prohibited practices might include, for example, corporal punishment (e.g., hitting, slapping, 
pinching, hair-pulling, extreme physical exercise); treatment of a demeaning nature; withholding 
meals, water, sleep, clothing, shelter, or access to bathroom facilities; intentionally altering food 




In issuing such regulations, the Department of Education should clearly note that these 
prohibited practices are not considered “interventions” or even “aversive interventions.” It is 
important to remove the label of “intervention” from these practices in order to make clear that 
such practices do not conform to the professional and ethical standards and cannot be justified on 
the grounds that they embody some approved ABA techniques.  
D.  The United States Department of Education Should Provide Guidance About Behavioral 
Intervention Practices 
In addition to issuing regulations that would identify prohibited practices, the U.S. 
Department of Education also should issue guidelines for implementing behavioral interventions. 
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The Utah guidelines begin by describing the manner in which PBS principles can be 
implemented to set clear expectations for student behavior throughout the entire school 
community.
484
 The guidelines stress that, when PBS strategies are implemented, the frequency of 
discipline and behavior issues across the school population can be greatly reduced.
485
   
Yet the Utah guidelines also provide great detail about the process of conducting an FBA 
and implementing a BIP to address the target behavior of a specific child.
486
 The Utah guidelines 
incorporate the principle of least restrictive interventions, stating that interventions should be 
chosen on the continuum so that the first interventions selected are the least intrusive.
487
 The 
guidelines also provide recommended practices for implementing and monitoring the use of 
“highly intrusive interventions,” including operationally defining the target behavior and an 
appropriate replacement behavior, collecting baseline data before implementing the 
interventions, training staff in the use of the intervention, collecting data, and re-evaluating if the 
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 Utah State Office of Education, LRBI Guidelines: Positive Behavioral Supports and Selection of 
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http://www.schools.utah.gov/sars/DOCS/resources/lrbi07-09.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) 
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 Id. at 6–13. 
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intervention fails to reduce the frequency of the behavior.
488
 
Perhaps the most valuable information contained in the Utah guidelines is a section that 
uses the PBIS website pyramid to rank behavioral interventions into each of the three categories: 
primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.
489
 At each level, the guidelines specifically identify 
the pertinent behavioral interventions and, for each intervention, the guidelines describe how the 
intervention can be implemented, any special considerations in implementing the intervention 
(including any potential side effects or “downsides”), information about data collection, and 




Included with the recommended interventions at both the secondary and tertiary levels 
are punishment-based interventions such as the use of verbal reprimands, time-out, and 
overcorrection.
491
 Included within the level of tertiary prevention are interventions such as the 
use of intrusive substances and stimuli like water mist, taste aversion, “forceful physical 
guidance,” mechanical restraint, inhibiting devices (e.g., a helmet).492 The guidelines provide 
that for each of these interventions parental consent should be obtained and a behavioral expert 
should be included on the child’s IEP team.493 
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If the United States Department of Education chooses to create guidelines similar to the 
Utah guidelines, there will be some difficult decisions to make. While some punishment-based 
interventions, such as the use of time-out (from reinforcement), overcorrection, response cost or 
response blocking may not be controversial, other punishment-based interventions, particularly 
the use of water mists, aromatic sprays, and contingent electric shock, will be controversial.
494
 
Resolution of the propriety of using highly intrusive interventions to address severe self-injurious 
and aggressive behavior will require extensive input from behavior analysts, educators, and 
parents, among others. The issue will require a thoughtful, extensive discussion that fully 
explores the moral, legal, and ethical considerations in order to arrive at some consensus as to 
procedures, if any, for the use of highly intrusive interventions. This Article does not make any 
specific recommendations in that regard, but offers the following thought.  
It is a sobering truth that some children exhibit severe behavior that endangers their lives 
and isolates them from their family, even as family members miss their children terribly and 
mourn their children’s inability to live freely in their communities. While some of the proposed 
interventions are difficult to contemplate, they can be effective to reduce severe self-injurious 
and aggressive behavior. It is for this reason that some behavior analysts consider contingent 
electric shock to be a permitted intervention in appropriate circumstances.
495
 Whatever the 
outcome of the discussion, all participants should put the rhetoric aside and presume that every 
other participant in the discussion seeks only to find the best solution for difficult and intractable 




 See Brown, supra note 139, at 217 (26.9% of ABA experts would recommend contingent electric 
shock); COOPER, supra note 21, at 334–50 (discussing contingent electric stimulation); Michaels, supra 
note 139, at 98 (9.7% of PBS experts would recommend contingent electric shock). 
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problems.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Treating severe behavior in disabled children is a complex task. In addressing such 
behavior, educators should not be constrained to select only those interventions subjectively 
viewed as “positive.” If a particular intervention will effectively reduce the problem behavior 
and does not involve inhumane or undignified treatment, then the intervention should be 
implemented even if it involves a punishment-based consequence.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Bryant, by erroneously interpreting IDEA to allow a 
state to implement a positive-only intervention scheme, only serves to complicate the process by 
which interventions may be deemed appropriate for any particular child’s behavior. When 
Congress next amends and reauthorizes IDEA, it should clarify the particular statutory 
provisions so that children with severe behavior have access to the appropriate interventions that 
they need. 
 
  
 
